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Introduction 
 
In July 2001, a 27 year old Russian computer programmer named Dmitry Sklyarov came 
to the United States to speak at DEFCON, a hacker conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
where he discussed and demonstrated weaknesses in the security of Adobe eBooks.  
 
Prompted by the software company Adobe Systems, Inc., the FBI arrested Sklyarov as 
soon as he finished the talk. The FBI claimed that the Russian citizen was violating the 
anti-circumvention features of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a U.S. 
law. Because his demonstration program was available over the Internet to all countries, 
the FBI argued, he was subject to jurisdiction in US courts. Sklyarov was jailed in the 
United States for several weeks and detained there for five months.  
 
Eventually Sklyarov was permitted to return home. An embarassed Adobe Systems Inc. 
withdrew its complaint against him, and his employer, Russian software company 
Elcomsoft, was ruled “not guilty” in the DMCA-based lawsuit brought against it. But a 
just outcome in this case did not just happen. Sklyarov’s arrest galvanized simmering 
opposition in the U.S. against the DMCA, sparking three months of public protests, 
leafleting, letter-writing and Internet-based oppositional activities. Protest rallies and 
candlelight vigils were held in at least 15 major U.S. cities, as well as in Rome, London, 
Moscow, Geneva, and Edinburgh. A global Internet chat summit, allowing activists and 
the public to discuss the case in real time, was held in August 2001. Advocacy 
organizations such as the Electronic Frontiers Foundation offered their expertise, assisted 
with the litigation and promoted public mobilization. The Sklyarov incident, in other 
words, was more than just a legal drama acted out in the courts. It involved the 
mobilization of public opinion by dedicated activists and advocacy organizations.  
 
This report is a long-term analysis of citizens’ collective action to influence public policy 
toward communication and information. In Chapter 1, we discuss in greater detail what is 
meant by communication and information policy (CIP) and why we think it is worthwhile 
to study it as a distinctive domain of public policy and citizen action. In this introduction, 
we want to focus on the concept of citizen collective action and explain why we studied it 
and what methods we used. We also provide a road map for the rest of the report, 
outlining what is in it and acknowledging what is missing. 
 
This is the first of what will be two reports. This report concentrates on citizen action in 
the United States and looks backwards, tracing the long-term evolutionary trajectory of 
communications-information advocacy in the USA. The second report will concentrate 
on international institutions and transnational advocacy related to communication and 
information policy, and will focus more on contemporary activity and issue networks. 
Public Interest Groups 
In a free and democratic society, citizens influence the political process not just by 
passively voting every two or four years. They also organize to continuously shape policy 
and legal outcomes, and to express their opinions to public officials so that the officials 
 5
will make decisions that reflect their own needs, problems and interests. Most of this 
lobbying is driven by economic interests – individual business enterprises, labor unions, 
farmers, industry and professional trade associations, or other “materially interested” 
groups and individuals. But there are also citizens who organize to promote some concept 
of the public interest. These groups promote ideas, ideologies, values, policies, laws or 
regulations that they believe will benefit society as a whole. Jeffrey Berry (1977), 
following theory developed by Mancur Olson (1966), defines a public interest group as 
“one that seeks a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and 
materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization.”  
 
Public interest groups focused on communication and information policy issues have 
existed for a long time. They can be liberal, conservative, socialist, non-ideological, 
something else. The American Civil Liberties Union, one of the oldest liberal groups, was 
formed in 1920 to promote freedom of expression. Public Knowledge, one of the newest 
liberal advocacy organizations, was formed in 2002 to resist overly aggressive 
intellectual property laws.  
 
This report had its genesis in a realization that there was no long-term, strategic analysis 
of public interest advocacy around communication and information policy, despite the 
fact that philanthropic foundations and members fund such groups and many people join 
or support them. How effective has such advocacy been? What are its sources of strength 
and what are its weaknesses? How have changes in technology and political institutions 
affected modes of organization, the agenda of the advocates, and the ability of public 
institutions to incorporate citizen action into communication and information policy? 
Methods 
To answer these and related questions, the report relied on three distinct methods:  
 
1. An analysis of the long-term organizational ecology of public interest groups 
focused on CIP 
Organizational ecology is a social science method that looks at organizations in a 
particular field as a population and analyzes how the size and composition of the 
population changes over time. Our research gathered data on the formation and 
disbandment of public interest advocacy organizations devoted to CIP issues in the 
United States from 1961 to 2002. That data permitted us to estimate changes in the size 
of the population, its ideological composition, which media or information policy issues 
the groups focused on, and which modes of advocacy were employed. 
 
2. A quantitative examination of hearings and testimony on CIP issues before the 
U.S. Congress 
We gathered comprehensive data about congressional testimony on communication and 
information policy issues in the U.S. Congress from 1969 to 2002. That data permits us to 
objectively measure the amount of Congressional activity on CIP issues in a given year, 
permitting analysis of how it changed over time and how the numbers compared to other 
issue areas. It also tells us how often specific public interest organizations and the 
individuals who work for them have gained access to lawmakers. 
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3. A critical historical narrative  
The report weaves a narrative around the quantitative data, tracing the evolution of 
citizen advocacy across the broadcast licensing challenges of the late 1960s and 1970s, 
the telecommunication regulation revolution of the 1980s, the battles over privacy and 
Internet censorship of the 1990s and the conflicts over digital intellectual property and 
media concentration in the 2000s.  
 
As far as we know, this is the first study to apply the tools of organizational ecology 
specifically to communication and information policy, and it is also the first to utilize 
recently developed data sources on congressional hearings in that policy domain. 
Although based on quantitative social science methods, the report is written to be 
accessible to ordinary readers interested in communication-information policy. We 
believe the report will be of interest to advocates, activists, lawmakers and policy 
analysts as well as scholars in information and communication policy, political scientists, 
and students of social movements. 
Limitations of the study 
No study of complex, long-term social phenomena is complete or perfect. Many things 
are missing from this study; in the discussion below we identify some of these gaps. 
 
First, we were only able to focus on a particular type of public interest advocacy. During 
our research, we came to understand that activism occurs on two levels. At the grass 
roots, there exists a buzz of loosely coordinated communications, meetings, 
demonstrations and cultural activities based upon interpersonal networks. This might 
involve participating in a local demonstration, attending a meeting, handing out leaflets 
on the street or at a shopping mall, or just persistently promoting one’s political views 
among friends and colleagues. We refer to this type of activity as activism or social 
movement activity. At another level, there are formally organized citizens groups that 
interact directly with the policy, law, and regulation-making apparatus of the government. 
We refer to this type of activity as advocacy and see it as rooted in advocacy 
organizations. Advocacy organizations attempt to directly influence what happens in 
Washington, DC or other governments, and as such must participate in making the 
bargains and trade-offs that define public policy in a given domain.  
 
This report focuses almost entirely on the formally organized advocacy groups. We did 
not have the time or resources to also study the grass roots and local manifestations of 
activism in a comprehensive, empirical way. Nevertheless, we realize that there is a 
symbiotic relationship between these two levels of citizen action. Social movement 
activities are based on communities of the like-minded – subcultures or ideologies that 
are based on shared norms and values more than on support for specific policies or laws. 
Activism of this kind tends to be more fluid and ephemeral, less formally organized and 
almost always less well-funded than national advocacy organizations. Nevertheless, it 
plays a critical role in creating and sustaining political demand for (or against) public 
policies. Advocacy organizations on the other hand are more in the business of translating 
the demands of constituencies into specific laws and regulations – and must also deal 
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with the problems of sustaining the organization itself. They provide a critical and 
unavoidable interface between social movement activity and political decision makers. 
Like social movement activists, advocacy groups also seek to generate demand for their 
policies, but in order to do so they need to mobilize activists and the social networks that 
sustain them. Very few, if any, organizations bridge the two functions.  
 
Another important limitation of this study is that we were able to touch on the influence 
of ideas, intellectual movements, think tanks, and foundation funding sources only in 
passing. As was the case with social movement activity, the more we looked into public 
interest advocacy groups the more we understood that there was a relationship between 
the formation and disbandment of these groups and the diffusion of policy ideas and 
political ideologies, which in turn are related to philanthropic giving and foundation 
grants. Our attempt to quantify the population and testimony of advocacy groups did not 
make it possible for us to also trace these relationships in any detail. However, by treating 
one aspect of the phenomenon of citizen collective action thoroughly, we believe that we 
have made it easier for other researchers to fill those gaps. 
 
Finally, with respect to the historical narrative we acknowledge that this narrative, like all 
others, is selective. Those familiar with the details of any given time period, group or 
event are almost certain to find things missing that they think are important. We 
encourage such readers to give us feedback, by means of the comment mechanism 
associated with the report’s web site. 
Overview of the study 
Chapter 1: A Vision of the Policy Domain 
We define and defend a vision of communication and information policy (CIP) as a 
comprehensive and integrated policy domain. We also define and describe the three 
primary modes of advocacy around CIP issues. 
 
Chapter 2: A Goal: Institutional Change 
We draw on theories of institutions and institutional change to provide a framework for 
the report. We assert that the concept of institutional change provides both a goal for 
specifying what citizen collective action could achieve, and a benchmark for assessing its 
historical impact. 
 
Chapter 3: A Bird’s Eye View: Four Decades of Congressional Activity and Interest 
Group Organization in CIP 
We present a macroscopic overview of the quantitative data. We show how the 
population of public interest advocacy groups has changed over 40 years and the growth 
in Congressional hearings on CIP from the 1960s to the present. We compare and 
contrast the public interest organization population with the population of commercial 
and professional advocacy organizations over the same time period. 
 
Chapter 4: The 1960s and 1970s 
We describe and assess the mass media activism of the mid-1960s and 1970s, the period 
of the most rapid rate of growth in the population. We show that most advocacy at this 
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time focused on broadcasting and cable TV. We discuss four major institutional changes 
in CIP that occurred in this period, with or without the advocates’ participation. 
 
Chapter 5: The 1980s 
We describe how the 1980s was characterized by major changes in both the political 
climate and the type of communication-information policy issues under consideration. 
We document the appearance of computer professionals and technologists organizing 
around computer-related policy issues in the organizational population for the first time. 
 
Chapter 6: The 1990s and early 2000s 
We show how digital technology became the focal point of institutional change in CIP, 
leading to an explosion of Congressional activity, bringing in a new generation of 
advocacy groups and creating a major change in the composition of the advocacy 
organization population. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
We attempt to summarize our findings and draw some conclusions about the future of 
CIP advocacy organizations and their policy agenda. 
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1. A Vision of the Policy Domain 
 
In this section, we define and defend a vision of communication and information policy 
(CIP) as a comprehensive and integrated policy domain. We also define and describe the 
three primary modes of advocacy around CIP issues. 
1.1 Communication-Information Policy (CIP) 
Communications and information policy refers to the role of laws, regulations, and public 
institutions in shaping the deployment and use of communication and information 
systems. The late 20th – early 21st century is distinguished by a technological revolution 
in information and communication and a re-structuring of businesses and social 
institutions employing the technologies. The effects are not confined to the mass media 
but embrace the entire economy and society. As this revolution has progressed, the 
boundaries of communities and polities have been redefined, laws and regulations have 
been rewritten, cultural identities and repertoires have been altered, and economies and 
organizational capabilities have been transformed. Public policy has played, and cannot 
avoid playing, a major role in this revolution – either as shaper, facilitator, or obstacle. 
 
Despite its centrality to all kinds of social endeavor, information and communication 
policy is not typically cited as an issue-area known for sustaining social movements, 
activism or advocacy. Instead, it tends to be viewed as a highly segmented and technical 
realm of policy making. But this seems anomalous, given the pervasiveness of the media 
in modern society, the economic and political importance of information and 
communication technologies, and the major political and economic struggles that have 
been and are taking place on this terrain. If information and communication are as critical 
to modern life as everyone seems to think they are, where is the public engagement over 
the politics of communication and information?  
 
In seeking to answer a similar question, law professor James Boyle (1997) wrote a paper 
drawing an extended parallel between the environmental movement and the struggle over 
intellectual property rights in the digital environment. The analogy was apt. 
Environmental problems and policies are grounded in what are often highly technical and 
specialized fields of knowledge. Yet when we speak of “the environmental movement” or 
an “environmentalist” almost everyone understands what it is and why an individual 
citizen might be engaged in it or contribute to it. Most members of the public have heard 
of organizations like Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth and can intuitively grasp how 
and why a citizen might see as related the passage of a bottle bill, the preservation of 
wilderness, and a campaign against toxic waste sites. The concept “environmentalist” 
links a distinct set of social problems to a policy agenda, an ethos, and a social 
movement.  
 
Communication-information policy does not yet benefit from the same generality, the 
same linkages. We do not even have a label. There is no such thing as a “communication-
informationist” (at least, not yet). To some, the term “media activist” serves as a crude 
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substitute, but that is inadequate and outdated because it promotes a focus on the mass 
media to the exclusion of everything else.  
 
Until now, studies of the policy and social problems of communications and information 
have tended to be segregated into separate literatures. Mass media, especially television, 
has drawn the lion’s share of research attention in communication and journalism 
schools. The policy issues of telephones, computers, and various other networked media 
(e.g., postal systems) were neglected for many years. When infrastructural policies were 
taken up in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they were left to economists and engineers. 
Issues of intellectual property and privacy became specialties within law schools. As a 
result of this segmentation, common normative standards and methods of analysis 
applicable to the whole domain of communication and information policy never 
developed. 
 
We believe that the digitization of information and communication technologies and the 
resulting convergence of media forms end that segregation. For that reason, in studying 
public efforts to shape policy we included not just broadcasting and television-related 
advocacy but all policy issues related to digital communication and the production and 
consumption of information products and services. Our view of advocacy includes battles 
over encryption and privacy, access to government information, the proper scope and 
definition of intellectual property, universal access, subsidies to content production, 
telecommunications regulation and radio spectrum allocation. This conception of 
“media” policy engages people not just as watchers of the tube, but also as transmitters 
and receivers of data; recorders, modifiers and small-scale publishers of content; 
consumers of fixed and mobile telephone services; writers and consumers of computer 
programs; e-commerce customers; users and consumers of government information and 
participants in governmental processes online.  
1.2 Modes of Advocacy 
While arguing for an integrated view of CIP, we nevertheless recognize that different 
communication-information issues and problems have inspired different modes of 
activism. (See the Table on the next page) A great deal of advocacy and activism around 
the mass media, for example, has been focused on the content of the messages 
transmitted to the public. Public debate has focused on whether media are politically 
biased, culturally stereotyped, harmful to health, overly commercial, and so on. Content-
oriented critiques of policy tend to be cultural in orientation and effect. Their object is to 
shape the public environment by affecting the messages to which we are exposed, or to 
create alternative cultures and worldviews based on alternative sources of message 
production and distribution. On the other hand, policy controversies around 
telecommunications infrastructure tend to be focused on political economy issues. 
Political economy concerns questions such as how to find needed sources of capital 
investment, the conditions of access and interconnection, the costs and benefits of 
government regulation or prices, market entry and service, the affordability of prices, the 
effects of competition, or the degree to which various regions or groups should be 
subsidized. In these debates, norms and expertise involving efficiency, economic  
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Advocacy Modes in CIP 
 
Content 
Definition: Advocacy organized around criticizing or problematizing the messages produced by the media.  
Examples  
• Calls to censor or restrict access to messages deemed offensive or indecent  
• Attacks on or exposure of stereotypes or negative representations of ethnicities, races and religions 
• Monitoring and criticism of political bias in journalism or the quality of reporting 
• Calls for production of socially responsible programs or the suppression of programs and messages 
deemed irresponsible 
Characteristic methods: Monitoring the media, regulatory interventions (e.g. license challenges), 
advertiser boycotts, persuasion of producers, civil disobedience, alternative production. 
 
Economic 
Definition: Advocacy that attempts to influence the conditions of supply of communication and information 
products and services 
Examples  
• Efforts to impose price, quality, market entry or market exit regulations on CI businesses  
• Attacks on media concentration 
• Efforts to direct subsidies toward alternative producers  
• Efforts to redistribute wealth among consumers and producers (e.g., universal service programs) 
• Efforts to influence or shape technical standards 
• Promotion of open source software 
Characteristic methods: Legislative lobbying, regulatory advocacy, participation in standards development, 
support or subsidization of alternative production capabilities 
 
Rights 
Definition: Advocacy that asserts individual rights related to communication and information.  
Examples  
• Defenses or assertions of free expression rights or anti-censorship campaigns  
• Advocacy of privacy rights  
• Promotion of right of access to government information  
• Defenses of fair use in regards to intellectual property 
• Claims of property rights (e.g., a claim that consumers have a right to acquire police radar-
detection equipment)  
• Agitation for new legal rights related to communication-information 
Characteristic methods: Litigation under existing law, promotion of legislation to define and create new 
rights, civil disobedience 
 
 12
development and technological innovation tend to have greater weight, although concerns 
of equitable distribution are also present. There is a third mode of advocacy that focuses 
on legal rights or entitlements. Privacy, first amendment and intellectual property-related 
activism fall most obviously into this category. In each area, activists contend that 
individuals have a right to engage in certain kinds of activities, and seek to protect that 
right against the incursions of the surrounding society, even when they are resisting a 
majority. These rights-oriented norms often run orthogonally to cultural and political-
economic norms. Advocates of first amendment protection for racists, for example, may 
not believe that there is any cultural value to the messages they are protecting, but they 
do think that the value of protecting an individual’s right of free expression outweighs 
most other considerations. Likewise, advocates of privacy protection may be willing to 
impose substantial costs or “inefficiencies” on the infrastructure of information handling 
in order to preserve the security and confidentiality of protected data and an individual 
person’s right to determine how information about him or her is used.  
 
Thus, in addition to being segmented by the specifics of the technological medium, 
advocacy related to communication and information has followed at least three distinct 
modes: the cultural or content-oriented mode, the political economy mode, and the rights-
oriented mode. Each of these modes is associated with different academic communities, 
different professional communities, different activist strategies, different forms of law 
and policy. Roughly speaking, cultural critiques tend to find their home in 
communication scholarship; political economy analysis is associated with economics and 
political science departments; rights-oriented thinking is grounded in law schools.  
1.3 Toward a Reinvented Activism  
This report is based on the assumption that segmentation of communication and 
information policy by medium or technology is no longer feasible or desirable.  
Digitization of communications and information processing has incorporated nearly all 
media forms into interoperable technological systems. This requires an integrated 
approach to policy – and to public interest advocacy as well. Quite apart from the 
technological fusing of media forms, which makes policy interdependent, the social and 
political issues raised by communication and information require treatment in a holistic 
way. If the information and communication industries account for nearly ten percent of 
the economy, advocates of cultural norms cannot ignore or avoid concerns about jobs, 
production and economic growth. If the implementation of information and 
communication technologies by government (so-called “e-government”) will reshape 
access to government decision makers, information and services, then advocates of 
democracy cannot be innocent of the constraints and capabilities of technology.  
 
One of the main goals of this report is to broaden and reshape our concept of the relevant 
policy domain. The issues and problems associated with the mass media need to be 
incorporated into a broader and more abstract framework of human rights related to 
communication and information activities. Such a broadening must also involve an 
understanding that such rights permeate all of 21st century life, embracing the private 
sphere as well as public discourse.  
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2. A Goal: Institutional Change 
 
“Periods of reform are puzzling moments when those with less power are able to 
change the rules by which old elites have prospered.”  
 
– Elizabeth Clemens, The Peoples Lobby. 
 
A core feature of the study is its focus on the potential of activism to catalyze institutional 
change in the communication and information sectors. The concept of institutional 
change provides both a goal for specifying what political activism could achieve, and a 
benchmark for assessing its historical impact. Our focus on institutional change is 
normative as well as positive. We prefer not to view advocacy or activism as an end in 
itself or as a lifestyle.1 We take an instrumental view of citizen collective action, and see 
institutions as the strategic target for advocates serious about achieving long-term change. 
We also believe that the new institutional economics, particularly the strand that 
emphasizes the distributional effects of institutions and institutional change, can 
contribute a great deal to the reinvention of “media” activism. 
2.1 Defining “Institution” 
Institutions are not a simple target. In common usage, the word “institution” is often used 
to refer to any well-established organization, such as the Ford Foundation or the Library 
of Congress. But in social theory institutions are not specific organizations. They are 
ordered patterns of social interaction in a particular domain. (Clemens, 1997; North, 
1990)  Organizations shape and are shaped by institutions, but institutionalism focuses 
more on the rules than the players. Knight (1992, 2) defines an institution as “a set of 
rules that structure social interactions in particular ways,” with the proviso that 
“knowledge of these rules must be shared by the members of the relevant community or 
society.” In addition to explicit laws, there are the customs and social norms that strongly 
affect how such rules are interpreted and put into practice. The term “rules” in this 
definition means both formal and informal expectations. 
 
An example of a relatively simple social institution is the convention of driving on the 
right side of the road. This pattern is grounded not only in drivers’ habits and 
expectations, but is also codified in written laws and enforced by police. The 
institutionalization of this domain of human activity makes driving more predictable and 
so reduces the costs of routine interactions. Institutions thus create social benefits.  
 
But one cannot explain the development of institutions solely in terms of the collective 
benefits they achieve. Knight (1992), Libecap (1989) and others have documented how 
the structure of institutions affects the distribution of power and wealth. Property rights 
are the social institutions that determine who has how much decision making authority 
over valuable resources. Without stable property rights, productive economic exchange is 
hindered if not destroyed. But property rights are not, as the extremes of both left and 
                                                 
1
 For an alternative view, see Calhoun (1995). 
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right would have it, a binary variable that either exist or do not exist. They can be defined 
in a variety of ways, and how property rights are defined strongly affects the distribution 
of wealth. A simple example of this is the term length of copyright protection. Longer 
periods of copyright protection transfer wealth from the consumers of intellectual 
property to the copyright owner, by eliminating competition in the reproduction of the 
work for a longer period of time. Shortening the term shifts wealth from copyright 
owners to consumers.  
 
Likewise, the design and structure of political and governance institutions strongly affects 
the distribution of political power. As an example of the latter, consider the following 
three governance structures that might be adopted by an international institution: a) a one 
country, one vote legislative assembly; b) a one person, one vote global electorate; c) a 
shareholding structure of the type associated with corporate governance. While any stable 
governance structure is likely to be better than none, the relative winners and losers 
would change dramatically depending on which of these institutional structures was 
adopted. Small countries would be relatively empowered by governance structure a), 
populous nations or ethnic groups would be empowered by structure b), and wealthy 
stakeholders would be more empowered under structure c). Some theorists go so far as to 
claim that the collective benefits of institutions are merely a byproduct of the way interest 
groups work out conflicts over distributional issues. (Knight, 1992, 27-47) 
 
The institutions ordering communication and information in the United States are 
complex and manifold. They involve numerous rule-making entities (Congress, the 
Federal Communications Commission, state regulatory commissions, international 
organizations and treaty negotiations), dispute resolution bodies (courts at various levels), 
a large and complex industry, and numerous technical standards and standard-setting 
organizations.  
2.2 Institutional Change 
If institutions are rules-based processes that channel social interaction, then institutional 
change occurs when something disturbs those patterns at both the mental and behavioral 
levels, provoking a systemic adjustment in the relations among organizations and 
individuals. That disequilibrating force must be strong enough to call into question the 
collective benefits created by existing institutions. “Institutional change” means 
overcoming the inertia of existing institutions and securing into place new rules and new 
organizational forms that deliver tangible new benefits to significant social 
constituencies. To elaborate, institutional change means that: 
 Changes in rules and norms occur, not just the changes in the behavior of specific 
actors in specific situations.  
 The rule changes alter the distribution of wealth or power in a significant way;  
 The new rules, like the old ones they supersede or replace, become self-
reproducing over time, and create their own inertia. Typically, this means that the 
changes must be broadly accepted as legitimate and that they are compatible with 
basic material constraints.2 
                                                 
2
 E.g., one can pass a law decreeing that everyone in a society will have million dollar annual incomes, but 
the law is meaningless unless the new organizations and institutions actually have that wealth to deliver. 
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More concretely, institutional change takes the form of major new national (or 
international) laws and policies and the allocation of resources required to make them 
effective; the creation (or abolition) of large government agencies; major shifts in the 
allocation of governmental and private resources; and the internalization of new social 
norms by the dominant culture in a way that legitimates and sustains the changes in 
power and wealth distribution. Most if not all of these aforementioned factors must be in 
play to qualify as the kind of institutional change we are interested in, not just one of 
them.  
 
Civil rights and environmentalism are clear examples of social movements that produced 
institutional change of the sort we are concerned with here. In both cases, sustained 
contention between organized citizens groups and their antagonists produced 1) major 
and difficult-to-reverse changes in state, federal and local laws; 2) new, more or less 
well-funded government agencies with novel forms of regulatory power;3 3) major shifts 
in the distribution of political power; and 4) widespread inculcation of new social norms 
into private behavior (overt racism or sexism is publicly unacceptable, pollution is 
stigmatized, etc.).  
2.3 Why Bother with Institutional Change? 
Not all activism produces institutional change, nor is it intended to do so. Many advocacy 
groups see themselves as upholding or sustaining existing laws or norms. Many activist 
organizations and causes are targeted at localized issues or problems and have little 
interest in systemic transformation of an existing order.  
 
Thus, we need to introduce an important distinction between advocacy focused on 
institutional change, and advocacy that is not. This report is interested in the former, and 
less so in the latter. By adopting this focus, we do not wish to imply that activism 
targeted on institutional change is “worthy” and other forms of activism are “less 
worthy.” On the contrary. Collective action by citizens to improve local conditions or to 
resist specific bad actions by government or the private sector is a vital part of an open 
society. From a normative standpoint, advocacy that sustains or defends good institutions 
is just as important as activity aiming in new directions. For example, a campaign or legal 
defense fund to prevent a particular group or web site from being censored constitutes a 
kind of activism that (in the United States at least) upholds widely accepted liberal norms 
and existing constitutional rights.4 Charitable efforts to ameliorate poverty may have a 
beneficial effect on the recipients, but most of this activity does not pretend to be 
catalyzing a long-term, institutionalized shift in the distribution of wealth. That kind of 
activism is just as important – and certainly more common – than sustained social 
movements aimed at systemic change. 
 
                                                 
3
  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
4
 On the other hand, efforts to prevent censorship from taking a new form and from being applied to a new 
medium such as the Internet, such as occurred with resistance to the Communications Decency Act, has 
long-term institutional significance.  
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Nor do we wish to overlook the ways in which more concrete and localized forms of 
activism might generate longer term institutional change. One can focus a great deal of 
energy on a specific corporate actor such as Clear Channel Radio, and have a real impact 
on that actor’s fortunes and behavior. In some cases, altering the conduct of that 
individual business may not have a long-term impact on the rules governing the structure 
of the broadcasting industry or on the norms and ideas guiding the legislatures’ and 
courts’ treatment of broadcasters. On the other hand, it is possible for advocates to make 
specific actors such as Clear Channel a “poster child” for abuses or problems that call 
into question existing policies. That in turn can lead to more generalized changes in 
attitudes and rules. As one leader of an advocacy group has put it,  
 
“When activist groups single out individual companies as the targets of their 
campaigns (e.g., RJR, Exxon, Nike), the goal is not just to change the behavior of 
that individual organization, but to raise the issue in the press, frame the public 
debate, and influence policy makers.  There are numerous examples of how these 
strategic, focused interventions have had significant impacts on industry-wide 
practices as well as public policy decisions.”5  
 
In general, activism aimed at institutional change is more difficult and expensive, longer-
term, more uncertain and riskier than activism targeted at smaller objectives. Indeed, 
because of the complexity of human society and the pervasiveness of unintended 
consequences, there is no guarantee that efforts at radical institutional change won’t make 
things worse rather than better. Why then does this report focus on institutional change? 
There are four major reasons.  
 
 First, the Ford Foundation is an organization capable of investing substantial 
amounts of time, energy and resources promoting some kind of social change. As 
a matter of efficient use of human and financial resources, it may as well think 
big. That is, Ford’s support of communication/information activism should be 
designed to produce effects that are institutionalized, systemic and “locked in,” as 
opposed to effects that are temporary, sporadic and localized.  
 
 Second, public interest activism as we know it was itself both a catalyst and a 
byproduct of institutional change that took place in the 1960s and ‘70s. Most 
veteran advocates understand that, and the evidence gathered by this report will 
further document it. What is less well understood is that the specific 
organizational forms and social norms of that period have themselves become 
institutionalized. What were once new challengers employing new organizational 
forms, new norms and new methods have become familiar, an adjusted-to part of 
the political landscape. Consequently, much of their energy or ability to transform 
has been spent. We wish to convey a sense that the specific form taken by public 
interest activism needs revitalization and reinvention, rather than reassertion and 
repetition.  
 
                                                 
5
 Comments on “Reinventing Media Activism (Preliminary Review Draft)” of Dr. Kathryn Montgomery, 
President, Center for Media Education, Professor, American University. July 28, 2003. 
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 Third, we note that many of the groups now involved in communications activism 
aspire to create institutional change, particularly change of the sort achieved by 
the civil rights and environmental movements. But many of these groups sense, 
correctly in our opinion, that they are no longer generating systemic change but 
are defending or preserving values and institutions against a competing movement 
(neoliberalism) with more momentum and power. Other groups, on the other 
hand, do see their current advocacy as agents of major institutional change. We 
are convinced, however, that all too often the second camp fails to appreciate the 
substantial burdens, both intellectual and political, that such a commitment 
entails. In particular, while valid and powerful expressions of dissatisfaction with 
the media status quo abound, the formulation of alternative institutional 
arrangements and the articulation of a politically feasible pathway to them are not 
so abundant. Thus, an analysis of how activism is related to broader institutional 
change seems to be needed in both instances.  
 
 Finally, institutional change in our field is taking place whether we want it to or 
not. The only choice is whether to participate actively or passively, as shapers or 
reactionaries. New institutions are being constructed at the international and 
national level in response to globalization and the rise of the Internet, e-commerce 
and e-government. That in turn creates pressure for adjustments at the national 
level. Institutional change is particularly evident in the domain of communication 
and information because of the drastically lowered costs of transnational 
communication and the liberalization of trade in communication/information 
services and equipment. The construction of new transnational rules, 
organizations and norms pertaining to communication and information will have a 
major impact on national institutions. The international arena presents a field of 
action that is more open to innovation and change than the national arena. In the 
developed countries at least, stable patterns of contention among the relevant 
constituencies have been forged and entrenched in the domestic arena over a 
longer period of time. Things are in greater flux internationally. 
2.4. The Paradox of Institutional Change 
The quote from historical sociologist Elizabeth Clemens at the beginning of this section 
presents a paradox. Like all good puzzles, it makes one stop to think. Thinking about it 
clarifies one of the key issues posed by institutional change. The paradox is this:  
 
If (as institutional theory suggests) the rules and norms currently in place reflect 
and reproduce the prevailing distribution of wealth and power, how do groups or 
individuals who are disadvantaged by or dissatisfied with those patterns of 
interaction ever manage to change them?  
 
What kind of social leverage or organizational jiu-jitsu is needed to make this happen? Is 
it driven by happy accidents? Technological change? New ideas? Violent conflict?  
 
The theory of institutions we are using provides a generalized account of what might lead 
to institutional change. If institutions are based on distributional bargains that reflect the 
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relative bargaining power of various social groups when institutions are formed, then 
change could come about by: 
• Changes that dramatically improve the bargaining strength of the formerly weaker 
parties 
• Changes that dramatically reduce the bargaining strength of the stronger parties 
• Changes that significantly alter the collective benefits that might be achieved by 
an institutional framework, either expanding or contracting them 
• Changes that allow the relative losers in one institution to migrate to alternative 
institutional arrangements 
 
We must stress, however, that no amount of scholarly research is going to provide a 
simple, reproducible recipe for altering institutions going forward.6 The achievement of 
consciously pursued social changes is an art, not a science. Social science can only give 
us clues as to where to look for strategic levers, and generalized descriptions of how 
various movements have done it in the past. Thus, below we provide a brief description 
of two particular phenomena with which institutional change has been associated in the 
past: 1) social movements, and 2) innovation in organizational forms. These are advanced 
not as guides to future action but as frameworks that help us to analyze and understand 
our historical review of advocacy in communications and information.  
2.4.1 Social Movements 
Research on social movements tells us that successful movements will take advantage of 
political opportunities unique to a historical moment, strategically mobilize the resources 
available to them, and successfully frame issues in ways that appeal to the public. Charles 
Tilly (2002) compares a social movement to a “kind of campaign, parallel to an electoral 
campaign,” but notes that “whereas an electoral campaign pays off chiefly in votes…a 
social movement pays off in the effective transmission of the message that its program’s 
supporters are (1) worthy, (2) unified, (3) numerous, and (4) committed.” In social 
movements the relationship between actions and the goals of the movement are diffuse 
and indirect: 
 
…as compared with striking, voting, smashing the loom of a nonstriking weaver, 
or running a miscreant out of town, [a social movement’s] actions remain 
essentially symbolic, cumulative, and indirect…Social movement mobilization 
gains its strength from an implicit threat to act in adjacent arenas: to withdraw 
support from public authorities, to provide sustenance to a regime’s enemies, to 
move toward direct action or even rebellion. (Tilly, 2002, 88) 
 
According to Sidney Tarrow, disruptive forms of contention are the strongest weapon of 
social movements because they “spread uncertainty and give weak actors leverage 
against powerful opponents.” However, disruption is also a highly unstable tactic. It 
requires high levels of commitment on the part of participants, and as Tarrow notes, 
“commitment in social movements is difficult to maintain over long periods except 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, such a formula, if it could exist, would be self-negating, because if anyone could follow it 
everyone would follow it, allowing the expectations of opponents of social change to converge on strategic 
countermeasures. 
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through formal organizations, which movements do not like, can seldom master, and – 
when they do – often turn them away from disruption.” (Tarrow, 1994, 98)  Regular 
reliance on disruptive tactics tends to split movements into “militant minorities tending 
toward violence” and “moderate majorities tending toward convention.” (Tarrow, 1994)  
2.4.2 Organizational Innovation 
While the social movement literature emphasizes ways to undermine or disrupt the 
equilibrium that sustains existing institutions, sociologists such as Elisabeth Clemens 
have called attention to the way organizational innovations usher into place new patterns 
of social interaction, locking in changed institutions. Clemens’ work emphasizes the 
ability of people to manipulate organizational forms and organizational repertoires. Her 
analysis is based largely on detailed studies of the historical origins of interest group 
politics in the progressive era, which contrasts the achievements of labor, farmers, and 
woman movement in that period. (Clemens, 1993, 1997) 
 
According to Clemens, how people organize is as important as what resources they have 
and what purposes they organize for. Think of what it means to organize as a social club, 
a paramilitary force, a religious order, or a Washington DC-based public interest 
lobbying group. Each one of these organizational forms is associated with a different 
repertoire of behaviors and actions. Each creates quite different expectations in the minds 
of its participants and invokes a different type of response by others in society. These 
internal expectations and external responses both enable and constrain what the 
organization can achieve. Shared mastery of known organizational forms facilitates 
collective action. Mutual knowledge of organizational forms facilitates cooperation based 
on tacit knowledge rather than explicit instructions. Organizational forms may also be a 
source of shared identity. (Clemens, 1997, 49-50) 
 
Once routine patterns of interaction are articulated and established, they become 
“modular” and can be transposed from one setting to another. This transposition of 
organizational repertoires can be a catalyst of institutional change. One strategy for 
securing institutional change is to organize “as if” existing institutions already apply to 
formally excluded categories of actors or domains of activity.” (Clemens, 1997, 189)  
The organized lunch counter visits of the civil rights movement, wherein African-
Americans acted as if they had the same rights as whites, fall into this category. This 
method dramatizes contradictions in society’s rules, reorienting peoples’ thinking and 
creating the opportunity of altering patterns of participation. An important insight from 
this perspective is that challengers who adopt familiar models of organization and use 
them for familiar purposes will simply reproduce existing institutions. The reverse 
strategy – challengers who adopt modes of organization that are completely unfamiliar to 
and disruptive of the surrounding society – is likely to invoke incomprehension, rejection 
and repression. Institutional change is most likely to come from challengers with 
organizational forms that combine familiar and unfamiliar elements. (Clemens, 1997, 62) 
Clemens’ perspective also offers insight regarding where to look for the wellsprings of 
institutional change. Contrary to romantic notions of the poor and downtrodden rising up 
to alter their conditions, institutional change almost always comes from constituencies in 
the middle. “Rather than resulting from the resistance of the most disempowered, lasting 
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rearrangements of institutionalized rules are more likely to be produced by the least 
marginal of the marginalized, the most advantaged of the disadvantaged.” (Clemens, 
1997, 12) 
2.5 Conclusion 
This section identified institutional change as the appropriate object of activism and 
advocacy, and provided definitions and descriptions clarifying what is meant by it. An 
argument was advanced as to why a focus on institutional change in communications and 
information is appropriate. Then, some tentative ideas were put forward about how 
institutional change occurs, and two methods of analyzing social change, the social 
movement literature and the organizational sociology of Elisabeth Clemens, were 
introduced. 
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3. A Bird’s Eye View: Four Decades of Congressional 
Activity and Interest Group Organization in CIP 
 
In this chapter, we present a macroscopic overview of communication-information policy 
advocacy from the 1960s to the present. Two kinds of quantitative data were gathered.  
 
First, we examined the number of U.S. Congressional hearings devoted to topics in 
communication and information policy from 1969 to 2002. The data shows both the level 
of activity (number of hearings) and the specific CIP issues upon which the Congress was 
focused at any given time.  
 
Second, we collected data about the formation and disbandment of communication-
information advocacy groups from 1961 to 2003. That method, known as organizational 
ecology, treats advocacy groups as a population. It contributes new data to the discussion 
of basic questions about advocacy as a long-term contributor to institutional change. 
Most of the evidence up to now has been based on anecdotes and case studies. We 
wanted to address more objective questions, such as: How many CIP advocacy 
organizations have there been? When did the number grow and when did it shrink? What 
is the composition of the population, in terms of advocacy modes or ideological 
orientation? What type of policy issue or communication medium did the organizations 
focus on? This kind of data about the population does not answer cause and effect 
questions, but it does provide a factual grounding for other discussions.  
 
The data we collected forms the backbone of the narrative exposition in later chapters.7 
3.1 Congressional Hearings 
To better understand the evolution of CIP issues over the period of study, we collected 
congressional hearings data using the Congressional Information Service (CIS) Index.  
The CIS Index provides access to all regularly produced congressional publications, 
including House, Senate, joint and special hearings.  After reviewing available index 
subjects, we created a list of terms that captured hearings relevant to CIP issues.  These 
terms included: “freedom of information act,” “right of privacy,” “intellectual property,” 
“broadcasting,” “computer and telecommunications,” “Internet,” “cable television,” 
“telecommunications regulation,” and “telephone.”8 In total, we collected 2281 records of 
hearings dating from 1969 to 2002. In general, the amount of Congressional activity on 
CIP has risen significantly over time. In 1969, there were only six hearings on CIP topics; 
in 2000 the number of CIP hearings rose to its maximum of 117. (Chart 3.1) 
 
                                                 
7
 The presentation here is intended for a lay audience. We try to avoid getting deeply involved in social 
science jargon and statistical techniques. The data and the analysis, however, are grounded in social science 
methods. We describe those methods in detail and explain their strengths and limitations in Appendix 1. 
8
 Some hearings were classified under more than one search term. In order to avoid double-counting, we 
created a category “Multiple search terms.” The historical rise in the number of hearings classified under 
multiple search terms (see Chart 3.2) is in itself an interesting indicator of change in the nature of 
communication-information policy. 
 22
Chart 3.1 
Total Number of Congressional Hearings on CIP issues - all topics
(Duplicates counted once)
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There are three peaks of congressional activity, each attributable to a distinct set of 
issues. The largest peak of activity by far is the one that occurs from 1997 to 2001. This 
can be called the “digital convergence peak” because it was driven by concerns 
associated with the interaction of computers, telecommunications, the Internet and cable 
television. Privacy issues were also a major concern. During this period, hearings that fell 
under multiple search terms (color-coded blue in Chart 3.2 below) were the largest single 
category. During that 5-year period, Congressional hearing activity on CIP stayed at 
somewhere between double and triple the amount for previous years.  
 
Prior to that, there were three other surges of hearings activity. A series of late 1980s-
early 1990s peaks reflects an interest in National Information Infrastructure that 
continued from the first Bush administration through the first Clinton administration.9 A 
smaller peak in 1983-84 was driven by issues pertaining to the AT&T divestiture. A 
surge of hearings in 1974-75 was generated by a conjunction of broadcasting regulation 
matters and post-Watergate concerns about privacy and the freedom of information act. 
In fact, that combination of topics (broadcasting, privacy and FOIA) dominated CIP 
hearings all through the 1970s. 
                                                 
9
 The “sawtooth” pattern characterizing the second half of the 1980s is well known to students of 
Congressional activity; congresspersons tend to be more active with hearings and related activity in odd 
(non-election) years. 
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Chart 3.2 
U.S. Congressional Hearings on CIP topics - By Search Term 
(Duplicates Counted Once) 
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If we compare Congressional activity on CIP to hearings activity on other social 
movement-related topics (Baumgartner & Mahoney, forthcoming), we see that 
communications and information has become one of the largest focal points of policy 
activity in the U.S. Congress. Since 1982 CIP has routinely exceeded 50 hearings per 
year and erupted to around 100 for five straight years at the turn of the century. In 
contrast, women’s issues reached a peak of 48 hearings in 1992 and rarely exceeded 30 
hearings a year. Civil rights and human rights-related hearings never exceeded 30 
hearings per year during the entire post-World War 2 period. Only environmental issues 
generated a comparable number of hearings during the same period. In 1992, hearings on 
environmental topics reached a level of Congressional activity that exceeded the CIP 
peak of 2000. After 1992, however, environmental issues declined to much smaller levels 
than CIP hearings.  
3.2 Analysis of the Population of CIP Advocacy Organizations 
Congressional activity both responds to and provides an opportunity for interest groups 
and advocates. In this section, we try to quantify the advocacy groups working on CIP 
issues. We examine two distinct populations. One consists of public interest 
organizations primarily devoted to CIP advocacy. The other consists of commercial and 
professional associations in communications and information industries involved in 
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policy advocacy. The separation of the two populations is based on collective action 
theory’s distinction between interest groups that are economically-motivated, such as 
business lobbyists, labor unions and trade associations, and “advocacy groups” or “public 
interest” groups motivated primarily by ideological or policy purposes.10 Both types of 
organizations play a role in shaping CIP, but fulfill different roles in the political process. 
The trade association Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), for example, 
consists of music publishers and was formed to lobby for the economic interests of that 
industry. If the laws and policies it promotes are enacted, its members receive most of the 
benefits. A public interest group such as Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), in 
contrast, would advocate policies different from those advocated by the RIAA, but if it is 
successful most of the benefits would go to people who are not members, supporters or 
contributors to EFF.  
 
Public Interest Organizations 
Looking at the 42-year study period as a whole, we identified 223 organizations engaged 
in public interest advocacy on various aspects of CIP. Chart 3.3 shows how the 
population changed over time. From 1961 to 2003, it displays the number of foundings, 
the number of disbandments, and the cumulative number of organizations. 
 
Starting with only 13 organizations in the 1961 period, the cumulative total of CIP 
advocacy organizations grew rapidly until the 1981 period, reaching 93 organizations. 
After 1981, the population continues to increase but the growth rate declines. The 
population reaches a peak of 115 co-existing organizations in 1997, and then begins a 
sustained decline over three periods. By 2003 the total had slipped back to the level it 
was at in 1981.  
 
An observation that leaps out from this data is that the fastest growth in the population of 
CIP public interest advocacy organizations took place not with the rise of the Internet, but 
in the late 1960s and the 1970s. That period coincided with the emergence of the 
foundation-funded advocacy group devoted to specialized policy issues. The same 
phenomenon took place over a wide variety of issue-areas, including environmentalism, 
civil rights, and gender as well as communication-information. (Baumgartner & 
Mahoney, forthcoming; Berry, 1999)  Although initiated by liberals, the organizational 
form of the public interest lobbying group focused on specific issue-areas was later 
adopted by ideologically conservative groups.  
 
In short, the citizens group was what Clemens (1997) called a generic “organizational 
form;” as such we would expect it to take root in a variety of policy areas, not just in CIP.  
Its adoption and utilization in communication-information, however, was legitimated by a 
critical change in the political opportunity structure: the United Church of Christ Office 
                                                 
10
 As Berry argues, one can attach the term “public interest” to organized advocacy groups without 
committing oneself to the idea that any of the groups’ goals correspond to some universally valid Public 
Interest, or even that there is such a thing as “the” public interest. What matters is that the group advocates 
a collective good that, if achieved, will not result in the material benefits produced being selectively 
concentrated on its members or activists. In making this distinction, Berry is relying on the collective action 
theory of Mancur Olson (1966). 
 25
of Communications’ legal victory giving citizens standing in broadcast license challenges 
(see Chapter 4).11 The first favorable decision in that case came in 1966,12 and was 
decisively resolved by an appeals court in 1969.13 In percentage terms, there was a huge 
jump in foundings in the 1970-71 period. As we shall see when we discuss the coding of 
the organizations, most of the organizations created in the surge of activism in the 1970s 
were focused on broadcasting policy and practices.  
 
Chart 3.3  Public Interest Advocacy Organizations (1961-2003) 
 
 
 
Thus, the public interest advocacy organization achieved legitimacy in the mid-late 1960s 
and proliferated rapidly during the 1970s and the early 1980s. But, following the inverted 
U-shaped pattern commonly seen in studies of organizational populations, the number 
leveled off in the late 1980s as birth rates declined and death rates increased, presumably 
because of limits imposed on the overall size of the population by the availability of 
human and financial resources and public interest in CIP issues. In the early and mid-
1990s, the growth of Internet-related advocacy organizations led to a moderate but brief 
surge in birth rates and in the cumulative total. After 1997, however, the decline 
continued, fueled primarily by huge die-offs of organizations in 1996-97, and 1998-2001. 
The main impact of the rise of the Internet was to change the composition of the 
population, not its size (See Chapter 6).  
 
Commercial and professional organizations 
                                                 
11
 See Horwitz (1997) for a review of the case. 
12
 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (1966). 
13
 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (1969). 
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The corresponding data for commercial-professional organizations concerned with CIP 
makes for a useful contrast with the public interest groups. There are a lot more 
commercial-professional groups than public interest groups. We counted a total of 357 
different organizations that came into existence during the study period. Of those, slightly 
more than 250 trade and professional groups existed in 2003, compared to 93 public 
interest groups.14 This is not a surprising finding. According to one recent political 
science study of interest group organization, “Survey after survey has revealed that 
companies and industry associations outnumber other [interest groups in Washington 
DC] by a large margin.” (Hart, 2003) 
 
Chart 3.4  Comparison of the Population Size of Commercial-Professional and Public 
Interest Advocacy Organizations, 1961 - 2003 
 
Industry and professional groups tend to be highly specialized in focus and surprisingly 
diverse in their politics. For example, the American Library Association must be 
classified as a professional group with a material interest in its policy positions, but it 
frequently aligns with rights-oriented public interest groups such as ACLU in 
communication-information advocacy. Likewise, several of the professional groups in 
communication work to advance the interests of ethnic identities and thus may frequently 
share goals with civil rights-oriented advocacy organizations. There is in fact a great deal 
of interaction between public interest advocacy groups and trade-professional groups; on 
any given issue one can see public interest groups coalescing with “materially interested” 
groups. Such cooperation can greatly increase the leverage of the citizens’ advocates, and 
vice-versa.  
 
                                                 
14
 Of course, this method counts only organizations, it does not count lobbyists for individual firms, which 
would tilt the lobbying scales even more toward the commercial and professional sectors. 
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Indeed, a valid criticism of the organizational ecology method is that isolating a specific 
population of organizations may obscure the ways in which one population might interact 
with another set of organizations. As one comment on the original report noted: 
 
[T]his kind of quantification [does not] capture the actual ebb and flow of 
organizations in and out of media activism.  This is particularly true of large 
multi-issue groups such as the National PTA, Consumers Union, ACLU, NAACP, 
etc. For example, Children Now, a children’s advocacy group founded in 1988, 
did not enter the national children’s media policy debate until 1993, as part of a 
coalition of child advocacy, health, and education groups that was formed during 
early days of the Clinton Administration.15 
 
When the commercial-professional and public interest group populations are compared, 
there is a significant difference in the timing of population change. Starting in 1961, a 
year where both populations exhibited similar growth, Chart 3.5 indexes the annual 
percentage change in cumulative organizations.  We see the population of public interest 
groups increasing by more than 600 percent in the late 60s and 70s, as compared to the 
more steady growth in the population of trade and professional groups, which merely 
doubled. Whereas the public interest groups grew most rapidly in the 1970s, the 
commercial-professional groups move to a new plateau during the 1980s, corresponding 
to the rise of the computer industry and the liberalization and growth of the 
telecommunications industry. 
 
Chart 3.5  Organizational Growth Rate Index (1961-2003) 
 
                                                 
15
 Comments of Kathy Montgomery, 29 July 2003 convening sponsored by the authors and the Ford 
Foundation. 
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There is also a notable difference in the way the two populations adapt to changing 
conditions. Mergers are more frequent among commercial-professional groups, and the 
names they adopt change more frequently in reaction to changes in technology and 
markets. Public interest groups on the other hand tend to adopt a more persistent identity 
and rarely merge. A persistent identity also means that the citizens’ organizations 
themselves tend to be less sustainable. Of the 223 public interest organizations observed 
over the 42-year period, only 93, or 41%, still existed in 2003. For the commercial-
professional groups, 71% of the 357 observed organizations survived at the end of the 
period. There is a huge difference in the survival ratio. To summarize bluntly, the 
population of public interest groups responds to changes in the political environment by 
letting old organizations die and forming new ones, whereas the population of trade and 
professional groups is more likely to adapt by modifying their behavior, name and 
membership.  
 
Modes of advocacy 
One of the most important mechanisms of adaptation is for newly formed public interest 
groups to adopt a different mode of advocacy. The orientation of advocacy groups toward 
content, rights or economic modes of mobilization has changed dramatically over the 
four decades studied. Once again, a major change is visible between the late 1960s to the 
1970s. But in this case instead of stabilization from the 1970s to the present we see 
continual change in the proportion of organizational observations representing various 
modes of advocacy. In particular, the rise of Internet-related policy issues in the late 
1990s seems to have made a big difference, pushing advocacy away from content and 
more toward contestation around individual rights and economics.16 
 
Table 3.1  Modes of Advocacy by Decade 
 
 Content Econ Rights Combination 
1960s 40% 20% 34% 6% 
1970s 51% 20% 20% 8% 
1980s 50% 17% 23% 10% 
1990s 44% 19% 29% 9% 
2000s 33% 23% 33% 11% 
        Percentage of organizational observations in each decade 
 
In the 1960s, rights-oriented advocacy organizations constituted 34% of the observations. 
As communication policy issues were caught up in larger social movements for civil 
rights and peace in the late 1960s and 1970s, the mode of advocacy became 
predominantly content-oriented. Activists claimed that mass media programming did not 
                                                 
16
 The change would be even more pronounced if one took the UCC case, rather than the somewhat 
arbitrary decade change, as the point of division. The first of the two UCC decisions was resolved in 
UCC’s favor in 1966; the rise of activism around broadcast license challenges started to produce new 
organizations in 1967. If 1967 is used as the point of division between the two periods, rights-oriented 
activism rises to over 41% of the observations in the early-mid 1960s and content-oriented activism drops 
to about 34%. 
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adequately represent the viewpoints or faces of various contentious groups.17 In addition 
to civil-rights oriented advocacy, the late 1960s-early 1970s produced a major rise in 
demands for mass media content to be more socially responsible. Organizations such as 
Action for Children’s Television, Project SMART (dealing with alcohol), campaigns 
against cigarette ads and violence all fit into this category. Also forming during this 
period of intense ideological conflict were advocacy organizations of both liberals and 
conservatives devoted to countering bias in reporting and representation of news. All 
sought to contest and/or regulate the messages produced by the mass media. 
 
Thus, in the 1970s content-oriented activism rose to 51% of the observations, and that 
mode of activism remained dominant (at 50%) throughout the 1980s. Conservative 
responses to the liberal-dominated 1970s contributed to the dominance of content. In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, culturally conservative organizations took a content-oriented 
approach to influencing policy, exposing what they saw as biased reporting (Accuracy in 
Media, Eagle Forum, World Media Association, Fairness in Media) or supporting the 
suppression of what they saw as programs encouraging or reflecting immoral and anti-
Christian values (National Federation for Decency, Clean Up T.V. Campaign, American 
Family Association). (Montgomery, 1989) 
 
In the 1990s, however, a growing number of organizational disbandments in the 1992-93, 
1996-97 periods, coupled with a significant number of new organizational foundings in 
the 1990-91, 1994-95, and 1996-97 time periods, produced a major change in the 
composition of the population. Content-oriented advocacy falls to 43.5% of the 
observations. The organizations dying off were predominantly content-oriented: anti-
pornography organizations, social responsibility advocates, advocates of ethnic 
representation and opponents of defamation. Notable disbandments include Action for 
Children’s Television (1993) and the venerable National Association for Better 
Broadcasting (1997). The new organizations, on the other hand, were more often rights-
oriented advocates associated with computers and the Internet, such as the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (1990), Electronic Privacy Information Center (1994), Center for 
Democracy and Technology (1995), Internet Free Expression Alliance (1997), and 
Domain Name Rights Coalition (1996). In the 2000s, the trend intensified, with new 
foundings such as Public Knowledge (2001) and Center for Digital Democracy (2001) 
and major die-offs of content-oriented groups such as Parents Music Resource Center and 
National Black Media Coalition. Observations of organizations devoted to individual 
rights-oriented advocacy grew to its highest level since the 1960s (33%); content-oriented 
advocacy fell to its lowest level ever (33%).18 
 
Economics-focused advocacy seems to have retained a steady share of observations 
(around 19%) throughout the study period. In the 2000s, however, it reached its largest 
                                                 
17
 Such organizations, however, sometimes spanned economic and content modes of advocacy by pushing 
regulations and policies promoting access to mass media, or by attempting to influence the hiring practices 
of broadcast stations. The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting is an example of an organization 
that was coded both ways. 
18
 As Appendix 1 shows, we performed a statistical test (Chi-square) on the advocacy mode data, from 
which we conclude that the two nominal variables (decade and mode of advocacy) are not independent. 
The test is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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portion ever (22%). This category includes consumer organizations and policy advocates 
focused on communications and information industry regulation, such as Consumers 
Union, Media Access Project, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Consumer Project on 
Technology. The number of groups that combine economic modes of advocacy with 
other modes has increased steadily. This seems to have occurred as advocates realize how 
closely their policy goals intersect with the larger (and once considered obscure and 
technical) issues of infrastructure regulation. More generally, combined modes of 
advocacy steadily rise during the study, from 6% to 11%, perhaps indicating a more 
integrated approach to CIP.  
 
Ideology 
Organizations were coded for their ideological perspective, when it could be known. 
Categorization was based on a combination of information about their positions and their 
funding sources. Organizations that combined liberals and conservatives, or which 
focused on a narrow issue capable of appealing to both perspectives (e.g., spam control), 
were classified as nonideological. Socialist and liberal-socialist united front organizations 
were put into a fourth category.  
 
The data reveal considerable changes in the ideological composition of public interest 
groups. It would appear that compared to the 1960s, more groups are divided into an 
ideological camp, and that most of the polarization took place between decade 6 and 
decade 7. 
 
Table 3.2  Ideological orientation of CIP advocacy groups 
 
 NONIDEOL. LIBERAL CONSERV SOCIALIST UNKNOWN 
1960s 25.4% 33.8% 18.3% 12.7% 9.9% 
1970s 15.1% 54.0% 14.6% 5.2% 11.0% 
1980s 13.5% 48.2% 20.6% 3.8% 13.9% 
1990s 15.1% 58.8% 16.8% 3.0% 6.4% 
2000s 12.6% 67.6% 13.5% 3.9% 2.4% 
Percentage of organizational observations in each decade 
 
From the 1960s to the 1970s, observations of organizations coded as “conservative” 
declined from 18% to 14.6%, while organizations coded as “liberal” jumped from 34% to 
54%. About 5 – 6 years after the surge of media-oriented liberal public interest 
organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, conservative groups began to organize on 
similar lines. Across our observations of the 1980s, observations of conservative 
organizations jumped from 15% to 21%, and liberal organizations’ share dipped for the 
first and last time. (The large number of unknowns for the 1980s could raise questions 
about the significance of this data.) What is most noteworthy, however, is the degree to 
which liberal organizations’ share of the observations increases after the 1980s. By the 
last decade, ideologically liberal organizations account for nearly 68% of all 
observations. Conservative organizations that focus on Internet policy are particularly 
rare.  
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If one breaks down resource measures by ideology, one finds notable differences between 
liberal and conservative organizations. There seems to be many more liberal groups 
competing for the same members and financial resources. The existence of a few large 
liberal organizations, such as ACLU and Consumers Union, skew the distributions and 
make the statistical means almost meaningless. But if one takes the median as a measure 
of central tendency one finds that liberals have a median budget of $386,759, a median 
staff size of 5, and a median number of members of 500, whereas conservative 
organizations have a median budget of $838,604, a median staff size of 7, and median 
number of members of 14,000. Thus, liberal groups, while much more numerous, 
typically have fewer members and financial resources, while conservatives have far fewer 
organizations with more members and bigger budgets.  
 
Communications-Information Medium 
Another, more obvious form of adaptation is for citizens’ organizations to devote their 
attention to different media forms, such as broadcasting, print, computers or 
telecommunications. We coded organizations by the media form(s) they targeted. Table 
3.3 summarizes the results.  
 
Table 3.3  Media Forms Targeted by Advocacy Groups 
 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Broadcasting & Cable  42% 46% 29% 24% 23% 
Broadcasting, Cable & Telecom 8% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
Print 16% 11% 8% 6% 5% 
Print, Broadcasting, Cable 4% 9% 17% 15% 9% 
Telecom 9% 5% 4% 5% 3% 
Telecom & Internet - - - 4% 6% 
Computers, Internet -  2% 5% 12% 23% 
All 11% 11% 14% 11% 12% 
Government info (FOIA) - - 2% 3% 2% 
Unknown 1% 6% 11% 6% 1% 
Other 8% 6% 10% 13% 13% 
Percentage of organizational observations in each decade 
 
Here we see a great deal of adaptation and change over time. As one might expect, 
broadcasting occupied the lion’s share of advocacy groups’ attention in the 1960s and 
1970s. But by 2003 policy issues raised by computers, telecommunications and Internet 
made up the primary focus of about the same number of groups as all forms of mass 
media combined. We saw no trend toward organizations focusing on “all” issues 
indiscriminately, however. While most organizations remain specialized in this regard, 
we do see a more even distribution of their efforts over a wider variety of media forms.  
3.3 Analysis: Public Interest Advocacy and Institutional Change 
The relevance of the data above will become clearer as we go through a more detailed, 
decade by decade narrative in the next three chapters. Some general observations are in 
order, however.  
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The hearings data show that CIP has taken its place alongside “the environment” as one 
of the main preoccupations of lawmakers over the past two decades. In the explosion of 
congressional hearings we see that a larger portion of the hearings are indexed under 
multiple terms, indicating a trend away from the segmentation of communication-
information policy issues into different discourses and different legal and regulatory 
regimes.  
 
The increase in Congressional activity is associated with growth in the cumulative size of 
the population of advocacy organizations. Statistical analysis reveals a strong, positive 
relationship between the cumulative number of public interest and commercial-
professional organizations and the number of congressional hearings.19 This is consistent 
with what has been demonstrated across several social movement organization 
populations and policy areas. (Baumgartner, Leech, & Mahoney, 2003)   
 
There was, however, a moderate negative relationship between the number of 
congressional hearings and the number of births of new public interest organizations 
devoted to CIP.20  Given the enormous increase in CIP legislative activity associated with 
the 1997 – 2001 period, it is somewhat surprising that there was not a corresponding 
surge of organizational foundings. Instead, there was a major increase in organizational 
deaths among public interest groups. We interpret this fact as follows. By the 1980s, the 
size of the advocacy organization population was nearing the “carrying capacity” of the 
political-economic system. The growth in death rates in the 1990s was associated with 
change in the composition of the population as opposed to change in its size. Dramatic 
changes in the communication and information industries, in technology and in social 
impact in the 1990s and early 2000s led to a major redistribution of membership and 
financial resources across issue-areas and media forms. Most notably, CIP advocacy 
responded with dramatic shifts in the dominant mode of advocacy: there was a steady 
diminution of the content-oriented advocacy associated with the 1970s and a move 
toward rights and economics. More organizations combine more than one mode of 
advocacy.   
 
This leads to one of our most important conclusions. We believe that the rise of public 
interest organizations in the 1960s was mainly a product of identifiable structural changes 
in U.S. political institutions.  
 
David Vogel describes some of those structural changes in his book on the political 
power of business in the United States. (Vogel, 1989)  He observes that from 1966 to 
1968 there was a tremendous outpouring of regulatory legislation from Congress in 
response to the rise of consumer and environmental movements.21 Reform-minded 
                                                 
19
 r(35) = .53 for public interest groups and .63 for commercial-professional groups, p<.01, two-tailed. 
20
 r(35) = -.41, p<.05, two-tailed. 
21
 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, the Federal 
Hazardous Substance Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the National Gas Pipeline Safety Act, the Truth 
in Lending Act, the Flammable Fabrics Act, and the Child Protection Act. For some reason Vogel does not 
track the civil rights movement as carefully as consumerism and environmentalism, but if the period is 
extended to 1964 – 1968 it includes passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which created the Equal 
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environmental and consumerist politicians and public advocates gained a political 
advantage by redefining the terms of policy debate. Environmentalism and consumerism 
shattered old patterns of business influence by raising issues that cut across nearly all 
industries and multiple policy domains. Business interest groups had been organized for 
and accustomed to sector-specific programs and lobbying. But environmentalism as a 
norm, for example, affected automobile manufacturing, product packaging, energy 
production, public sewage and waste disposal and a host of other sectors that had in the 
past been segregated into distinct policy domains. Business interests had few established 
mechanisms for coalescing with other businesses in other sectors, were not prepared with 
counter-arguments against the newly formulated norms, and thus were not prepared 
tactically to counter public interest advocacy in the wider political arena.22  
 
Vogel identifies a number of other historically specific conditions that led to the rise of 
public interest movements and a decline in the relative strength of business interest 
groups during this period. Most critical in his opinion is that post-World War II economic 
growth had been robust for many years and was largely taken for granted. Long-term 
growth bolstered public confidence that government could redistribute wealth or impose 
costs on business to improve social conditions with little pain. Another important change 
was the massive expansion of higher education that took place during the 1960s. The 
“citizens’ movement” was able to identify and mobilize a new constituency, consisting of 
educated, upper middle class baby boomers, while drawing on the classical liberal-
democratic coalition. Other changes facilitated these tendencies. The rise of national 
television and of direct mail as a fundraising technique reinforced the prospect of issue-
oriented politics. All of these factors changed the rules of lobbying in ways favorable to 
the new forms of interest organization, creating opportunities that were seized by public 
figures such as Ralph Nader and Martin Luther King.  
 
Complementing Vogel’s argument, the work of Jeffrey Berry (1977; 1999) focuses 
specifically on public interest advocacy groups in roughly the same period covered by 
our study. Berry argues that public interest advocacy organizations (or what he calls 
“citizens groups”) constitute a new kind of “post-materialist politics” and shows that this 
form of politics has been institutionalized since the mid-1960s. Citizens’ groups “have 
been remarkably successful in influencing public policy” in Washington and at getting 
media coverage for their views. (1999, p. 2-3)23 
 
The citizens lobbying group (usually focused on specific policy issue-areas), and the 
public interest law firm (also typically focused on specialized areas of law) can thus be 
considered new modular forms of interest organization that developed in the late sixties 
                                                                                                                                                 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. During this period, too, the 
Federal Trade Commission issued a report proposing to ban cigarette advertising on television. The ban on 
cigarette advertising was implemented in 1970. 
22
 At that time, the Business Roundtable, a lobbying group of 200 or so CEOs from the nations largest firms 
started in 1972, helped redirect specific business lobbying efforts towards more general business issues. For 
instance, they took up issues such as labor law, which cut across industry boundaries, in an effort to drive 
the congressional agenda. (Berry, 1984) 
23
 Incidentally, his data shows that liberals are much more effective at using this organizational form than 
conservatives, at least when it comes to influencing Congressional legislation. 
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and early seventies.24 These groups created a visible, issue-focused presence in the 
media, Congress, and the regulatory bureaucracies that would follow up on and advance 
reform agendas. Like several other political scientists who have studied interest group 
organization and political opportunity structures, Berry (1999, p. 29-30) describes a self-
reinforcing cycle that occurs when the advocacy groups succeed. Early political 
entrepreneurs engage the institutional system in some way; if the system rewards them by 
opening up channels for influence and producing positive results, more collective action 
follows. (See also Walker, 1991) Once an activated interest or advocacy group has been 
formally incorporated into an institutional structure, it is not unusual to see the 
institutional structure subsidizing the groups directly – for example, the Community 
Relations Service of the Justice Department in the early 1970s is known to have aided 
broadcast license renewal challenges by minority groups. (Schement, Gutierrez, Gandy, 
Haight, & Soriano, 1977) 
 
In conclusion, if we were to attempt to identify the underlying recipe for institutional 
change in the mid-1960s-1970s we would see: 
1. An articulation and long-term cultivation of challenging new social norms (racial 
equality, feminism, consumerism, environmentalism) by sustained social 
movements; 
2. The insertion of these norms into the political and institutional structure in ways 
that cut across entrenched power relationships; 
3. Changes in national political structures and communication technologies that 
created opportunities for new political entrepreneurs; 
4. An identification and mobilization of new constituencies, not simply a rallying of 
existing constituencies; 
5. The development and institutionalization of a new organizational model, the 
public interest lobbying and litigation organization, capable of serving as the 
interface between the newly mobilized constituencies and the government. 
 
Note well that item #5 on the recipe seems to have come after, rather than before, most of 
the major institutional changes were well underway. Vogel (1989, p. 38-39) shows that 
formal organization of most consumer advocacy groups took place after the rush of 
consumerist regulatory legislation enacted between 1966 and 1968. The same proves to 
be true of the first wave of media advocacy organizations. Public interest advocacy 
groups helped to maintain and extend the social movements of the 1960s; they do not 
seem to have been the principal cause of them.  
 
It follows that any major revival of public interest activity around CIP will hinge more on 
structural changes in political institutions than on an increase in legislative activity per se. 
                                                 
24
 The public interest law firm had a longstanding precursor in the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), which we count in our data as a communications-information advocacy organization. ACLU was 
founded in 1920. It acted as a legal defense fund for socialists whose freedom of speech or association was 
violated during the red scares of the 1920s, suffragists and sex educators, and many other types of 
defendants. It used litigation to pursue liberal and progressive policy goals long before the public interest 
law firm became a generic form. 
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4. The Rise of Activism: the mid-1960s through the 
1970s 
 
This chapter describes the origins of contemporary media activism and the conditions that 
led to its proliferation in the 1970s. The mid-1960s and 1970s was the period of the most 
rapid growth in the cumulative number of advocacy organizations. For the most part, the 
advocacy surrounding communications and information during this period was connected 
to and subordinate to other social movements – civil rights, consumer, environmentalist, 
feminist, and peace. We also show, however, that the early debates over cable television 
sowed the seeds of an autonomous communication-information advocacy movement.  
4.1 Political Opportunity and the WLBT Case 
Ultimately it was broadcasting, and specifically broadcast licensing, that ushered in the 
era of the media advocacy group as the major mechanism for citizen participation in 
communications policy. Some background may be necessary here. The Radio Act of 
1927 nationalized the radio spectrum and subjected broadcasting to a regime of licensing. 
Until fairly recently, broadcast licenses were the most important channel of mass 
communication to the public in any given locality, and were highly restricted in supply. 
This made broadcast licenses extremely valuable in economic and political terms. The 
history of U.S. broadcasting is rife with contention over their control and management. 
The result of that contention was a social compact in which licensees became “public 
trustees.” They were granted exclusive use of a scarce and valuable resource (the 
broadcast channel and license) and thus were obligated to submit to regulation by an 
independent agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC served 
as a proxy for the public and applied a public interest standard to their conduct, including 
programming decisions. Radio and television licenses had to be renewed every three 
years. While the “scarcity” on which this system was based was overstated at the time 
and has long since been abolished, the institutional structure has remained due to the 
strong linkages it forged between regulators, local broadcast outlets, and a US political 
structure based on territorial representation. (Galperin, 2004; Hazlett, 1990)  
 
Latent activism 
Prior to the citizens’ challenges associated with the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was 
a long period of latency in which consumers organizations and listeners associations 
expressed dissatisfaction with broadcasting and occasionally (and always unsuccessfully) 
mounted challenges to license transfers. (Guimary, 1975, p. 34-36)  Public dissatisfaction 
with commercial broadcasting began to manifest itself around 1959. Two key indicators 
were the quiz show scandals of 1959 and FCC Commissioner Newton Minow’s widely 
quoted speech describing television as a “vast wasteland” in 1961. Asked by Congress to 
review the performance of regulatory commissions, the Consumer’s Union in 1959 
singled out the FCC for some of its strongest criticism. (Guimary, 1975, 34)  A 
Consumers Union report called for the creation of a Television Consumer Council with 
the authority to review all FCC licensing decisions, and mandatory hearings in the 
affected locality before a broadcaster’s license could be renewed.  
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UCC v. WLBT and broadcast license renewal challenges 
The proliferation of activist groups in communication and information followed a 
textbook case of a political opportunity created by an innovative act of public interest 
litigation. The innovation was to link a broadcast license challenge to the civil rights 
movement. This was done in a particularly challenging, even dangerous context: a 
Jackson, Mississippi broadcaster with ties to the white Citizens Council, WLBT-TV, was 
challenged by Everett Parker, head of the United Church of Christ’s (UCC) Office of 
Communication in partnership with a local NAACP chapter and another African- 
American resident in the viewing area. Parker started the challenge in March 1964: 
 
The station had failed to serve the interests of the substantial Negro community in 
its viewing area (which represented approximately 45% of the total population 
within the station's prime service area), and had further failed to give a fair 
presentation of controversial issues, especially in the field of race relations. 
(Horwitz, 1997)  
 
This conduct was clearly inconsistent with the public trustee mandate of the law, but the 
FCC routinely failed to do anything about it. UCC gathered the resources needed to 
document the station’s practices and challenge the station’s license before the FCC at 
renewal time. Because the station's performance violated the public interest provisions of 
the Communications Act, the petitioners asked that they be permitted to intervene and be 
heard in the license renewal proceeding.  (United Church of Christ, 1964)  Parker’s 
purpose was not only to overturn the offending conduct of the station, but also to give 
minorities and citizens groups legal standing in FCC proceedings. 
 
Reflecting its status as a regulator deeply enmeshed in a don’t-rock-the-boat equilibrium 
with the regulated industry, the FCC voted 4-2 that Parker and his compatriots lacked the 
legal standing to participate in the license renewal proceedings. The UCC appealed the 
denial of standing in federal court, and in 1966 won a decision upholding their right to 
participate in license renewal proceedings.25 Even after granting UCC standing, however, 
the FCC renewed WLBT’s license after a highly biased hearing in Mississippi. After 
appeal of the hearing results by United Church of Christ, the same U.S. Appeals court 
overturned the FCC decision and revoked the license.26 Winning the WLBT case made 
United Church of Christ v. FCC a major precedent employed by environmental and 
consumer public interest groups.27  
 
The WLBT cases altered the advocacy landscape in two significant ways. First, it 
formally gave members of the public legal standing in license renewal cases before the 
FCC. Second, it signaled that licensees who violated civil rights norms were vulnerable 
to such challenges, thereby issuing an open invitation for mobilized minority groups and 
                                                 
25
 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (1966). 
26
 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (1969). 
27
 Indeed, the issue of citizens’ standing before regulatory authorities was litigated simultaneously by 
environmental groups. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, (1965). 
Cited in Horwitz (1997). 
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others dissatisfied with broadcasters in their locality to organize challenges. Schement, 
Guitierrez, et al (1977) document one of many such challenges in San Antonio Texas. 
 
That in turn led to massive growth in the number of advocacy groups focused on 
broadcasting. (See Table 4.1 below) From 1967 to 1975, a large number of national 
organizations and local coalitions of ethnic and minority groups arose to focus on license 
renewals. The major liberal philanthropic foundations (Ford, Markle, Rockefeller) 
donated millions of dollars to the support of these efforts. The national organizations 
served as centers of legal expertise or coordinating committees for the smaller, more 
numerous and less well-organized and -funded local groups.  
 
The WLBT case not only led to an increase in the number of media activists and 
advocacy organizations, but also shaped their methods. Most citizen collective action 
focused on license renewal challenges – or entered into direct negotiations with the 
broadcasters or networks about programming or hiring knowing that a challenge was 
always an option. The tremendous economic value of license renewal to broadcasters and 
the costs of defending themselves in renewal proceedings gave the challengers 
considerable leverage. As media activism proliferated, the number of petitions to deny 
grew by several orders of magnitude. By 1975 the FCC had a backlog of 200 unsettled 
petitions. (Grundfest, 1977)  Seventy five percent (75%) of license renewal challenges in 
this period were based on alleged failures to ascertain the programming needs of minority 
viewers or employment discrimination issues. (Guimary, 1975, 48) 
4.2 The Organizational Ecology of the Period 
The UCC lawsuits linking mass media policy to the civil rights and citizens movements 
had a major impact on the organizational ecology of the period. From 1964, the date the 
UCC lawsuits were initiated, until 1979 the cumulative total of advocacy organizations 
grew from 18 to 77. The focus of the new advocacy organizations was overwhelmingly 
on broadcasting, and usually targeted its content. A smaller minority of organizations 
dealt with cable television. There was a major shift in the mode of advocacy toward 
content (from 40% to 51%). There was also a major shift in ideology, with liberal 
organizations rising from 34% of the total in the 1960s to 54% of the total observations in 
the 1970s, and conservative organizations declining from 18% of the total observations in 
the 1960s to only 14% of the total observations in the 1970s. 
 
Table 4.1 lists 49 advocacy organizations focused on communication and information 
policy founded from 1967 to 1975, inclusive. Of those, twenty-nine (29), or about 60%, 
were focused primarily on broadcasting and cable. (If the time span is reduced to 1967 – 
1971, about 71% of the organizations are focused on broadcasting and cable.) Only five 
(5) of the organizations were conservative in orientation; most of the rest were 
identifiably liberal or “progressive.”  
 
Congressional Hearings 
As can be seen from Chart 4.1 (two pages below), Congressional activity trended 
upwards during the 1970s, moving from less than 10 in 1969 to consistently over 30 per 
year by the end of the decade. The focus of congressional hearings was on privacy, 
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freedom of information and broadcasting. The peak of CIP activity in 1975-75 reflects a 
combination of the Watergate scandals, the passage of the 1974 Privacy Act (see section 
4.4 below) and some legislative changes regarding broadcast licensing. 
 
Table 4.1  Organizational Foundings, 1967 – 1975 
 
Name Founding Primary interest 
Consumer Federation of America 1967  
Council for Children's Television and Media 1967 Broadcasting 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting 1967 Broadcasting 
Action for Children's Television 1968 Broadcasting 
Christians United for Responsible Entertainment 1968 Broadcasting – Conserv 
National Friends of Public Broadcasting 1968 Broadcasting 
National Mexican American Anti-Defamation Committee 1968 Broadcasting 
Accuracy in Media 1969 Conserv 
Black Efforts for Soul in Television 1969 Broadcasting 
Citizens Communications Center for Responsive Media 1969 Broadcasting 
Crusade for Decency 1969 Broadcasting – Conserv 
Foundation to Improve Television 1969 Broadcasting 
Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press 1969  
Alliance to End Repression 1970  
Black Awareness in Television 1970 Broadcasting 
Council on Children, Media and Merchandising 1970 Broadcasting 
National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties 1970  
Task Force for Community Broadcasting 1970 Broadcasting 
Women's Film Co-op 1970  
Nosotros 1970 Broadcasting 
Black Citizens for a Fair Media 1971 Broadcasting 
Media Access Project 1971 Broadcasting/Cable 
National Association of Progressive Radio Announcers 1971  
Network Project 1971 Cable 
Open Channel 1971 Cable 
Public Citizen 1971  
Publi-Cable 1971 Cable 
Justicia 1971 Broadcasting 
Committee on Public Doublespeak 1972  
Gay Media Task Force 1972 Broadcasting 
Speak Out! 1972  
Student Legal Action Organizations 1972 Broadcasting 
Synanon Committee for a Responsible American Press 1972  
Women's Institute for Freedom of the Press 1972  
Center for the Rights of Campus Journalists 1973  
Federation of Information Users 1973  
National Black Media Coalition 1973 Broadcasting 
National News Council 1973  
Truth in Advertising 1973 Broadcasting 
Caucus for Producers, Writers and Directors 1974 Broadcasting 
Media Action Research Center 1974 Broadcasting 
National Coalition Against Censorship 1974  
National Council for the Public Assessment of Technology 1974  
Student Press Law Center 1974  
Americans for Decency 1975 Broadcasting – Conserv 
Eagle Forum 1975 Conserv 
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Feminists on Children's Media 1975  
Media Alliance 1975 Broadcasting 
National Citizen Communication Lobby 1975 Broadcasting 
 
Chart 4.1
U.S. Congressional Hearings on CIP topics: 1970s
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Congressional testimony by public interest advocates from 1969 - 1979 was dominated 
by the American Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU accounted for 20 percent of all 
testimony on CIP issues by all public interest groups. 
 
 
Table 4.2  Top Ten Public Interest Organizations Testifying on CIP issues, 1970s 
 
Organization name 
% of 
testimony by 
p.i. groups 
American Civil Liberties Union 18.33% 
Consumer Federation of America 4.00% 
Common Cause 4.00% 
United Church of Christ 3.67% 
National Black Media Coalition 3.00% 
Citizens Communications Center 2.67% 
National Citizens Communications Lobby 2.67% 
Public Citizen 2.33% 
National Organization for Women 2.00% 
NAACP 1.67% 
Center for the Study of Responsive Law 1.67% 
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Economic advocacy 
While the grass-roots organizations focused primarily on challenges to local licensees, 
the Nader-related, Washington-based groups started to develop an economic agenda for 
media advocacy.  
Media advocates in the 1960s and 1970s seized on a 1943 NBC v. FCC Supreme Court 
decision to advocate successfully for rules regulating the structure of the industry.  For 
example, the Syndication and Financial Interest rules (Fin-Syn) prohibited networks from 
owning their programming, forcing them to rely on independents for programming in 
order to increase the diversity of ideas that received access to the airwaves.  The Prime 
Time Access Rules (PTAR) required networks to “give back” half an hour of prime time 
to local affiliates. Of greatest significance, however, were the creation in this period of 
both the newspaper/broadcast cross ownership prohibition in 1976 and the 
cable/broadcast cross-ownership prohibition in 1975. In backing the FCC’s Fin-Syn and 
PTAR regulations, the advocates aligned themselves with content producers and local 
affiliate stations, respectively, whose economic interests were greatly enhanced by the 
rules.  
 
Cultural Conservative advocacy 
Contentious repertoires and organizational forms can be learned, imitated, and adapted to 
the purposes of groups not in accord with the original intentions of their developers. 
Thus, only about five or six years after the surge of media-oriented liberal public interest 
organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, culturally conservative groups began to 
organize on similar lines. Of the 30 advocacy organizations classified as “Conservative” 
throughout the whole period, 15 came into being in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The 
older conservative organizations, formed in the 1940s, ‘50s and ‘60s, tended to be 
associated with the Catholic Church. Three of these went out of existence in the 1970s.28 
Many of the newer conservative organizations were Protestant, and saw themselves as 
locked in a “culture war” with “the liberal media” and more broadly with the counter-
cultural, relativistic, and secular ideas of the period. As such, they focused on content 
policy, either exposing what they saw as biased reporting (Accuracy in Media, Eagle 
Forum, World Media Association, Fairness in Media) or supporting the suppression of 
what they saw as programs encouraging or reflecting immoral and anti-Christian values 
(National Federation for Decency, Clean Up T.V. Campaign, American Family 
Association). Donald Wildmon’s National Federation for Decency teamed up with Jerry 
Falwell’s Moral Majority to pioneer the use of boycott threats against advertisers to get 
networks to change TV programming. (Montgomery, 1989) 
                                                 
28
 National Office for Decent Literature, Citizens for Decent Literature, Catholic Broadcasters Association 
(UNDA-USA). 
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4.3 From Broadcasting to Cable Television: Early Encounters 
with Convergence 
Cable-related activism also started in the late 1960s and early 1970s and involved some 
of the groups already involved in broadcast license challenges (e.g., Media Access 
Project, National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting). But there was an important 
difference. Broadcasting was a mature technology and industry lodged in an institutional 
setting that had been in place for decades. Cable TV, on the other hand, was a newly 
developing infrastructure still trying to find out where it stood in the legal and regulatory 
environment. Its emergence attracted idealistic hopes and visions as well as legal and 
policy conflict. Like public television and later the Internet, cable came to be viewed by 
liberal elites and media activists as the “last best chance” for realizing the potential of 
mass media TV. Revealing widespread dissatisfaction with the quality and 
responsiveness of commercial TV, there were at this time frequent expressions of the fear 
that cable would devolve into something like commercial broadcasting. Several activists 
we interviewed attributed a decline in Foundation funding of media activism in the later 
1970s to the foundations’ belief that cable TV would solve problems of terrestrial 
broadcasting. The attitude was that “there will be a channel for everyone and you won’t 
have to fight about it any more.”29  
 
Guerilla Television and Public Access 
One offshoot of the late 60s/early 70s counterculture was a utopian belief in the power of 
communications technology to transform society. The ideas of Marshall McLuhan (1964, 
1969) melded with early manifestations of techno-culture formed around developments 
such as the experimental film and the portable video camera. (Youngblood, 1970)  Two 
products of this intersection were the concepts of “guerilla television” and “public 
access.” Guerilla television envisioned small-scale independent producers of 
documentaries that would promote social justice by exposing unacceptable social 
conditions and giving voice to the voiceless members of society. The concept of public 
access was conceived as the means of disseminating this revolutionary mode of content 
production. It sought to replace one-way mass audience entertainment transmissions of 
commercial broadcasting with what we might now call a “commons:” a completely 
unrestricted and nondiscriminatory pipeline to the public, unsullied by marketing and 
advertising. George Stoney, a documentary filmmaker based at New York University, co-
founded with Red Burns the Alternative Media Center, a meeting and training locale for 
many of the activists who fought for cable access. 
 
In its push for completely unmediated access between content producers on the street and 
an engaged public, this vision tended to downplay or ignore altogether critical economic 
constraints, such as the need to recoup major investments in infrastructure and content 
production and the need to market and promote productions to get audiences’ attention. It 
also exaggerated the degree to which the general public (as opposed to the subculture 
involved with independent media) wanted to be involved with and challenged by TV 
rather than entertained and diverted by it. 
 
                                                 
29
 Telephone interview with Jeff Chester, Center for Digital Democracy, February 3, 2003. 
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The alternative television movement was more of an artistic counter-culture than an 
attempt to formally change institutions. But they influenced many legally inclined, 
mainstream advocates, who took their visionary ideas and tried to translate them into 
policy proposals. These proposals involved three prongs: 1) common carrier status for 
cable distribution, 2) promotion of public access channels, and 3) technological 
mandates. The main leverage for imposing these policies came from local franchising 
decisions. Efforts by local activists to intervene in franchising decisions were supported 
by foundation-funded cable TV information services and research efforts. (Smith, 1972, 
81) 
 
Structural regulation 
A catalytic role in policy proposal formation was played by the ACLU’s 
Communications Media Committee, formed in 1968. Personalities such as Sidney Dean, 
Irwin Karp and Fred Powledge were involved.30 In 1972, the ACLU Committee 
published what it called “rough guidelines” for its chapters to help “involved citizens” 
influence cable policy. (Powledge, 1972, 31-39)  “First and foremost,” ACLU believed 
that cable franchisees should be limited to building the distribution system and then 
leasing the available channels to other programmers. In this model of industry 
organization, cable operators would not possess any control over the programming that 
they carried.31 If common carrier status was achieved, there would be no need for set-
asides or subsidized access for public access channels. As a common carrier, cable 
operators also would have no liability for censored content. The ACLU saw no need for 
the equal time and fairness doctrines either if cable became a common carrier, but 
believed in retaining those rules until such status was achieved. Rates should be “fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” As of 1972, ACLU was “in the process of 
formulating its position on the entire question of cross-ownership,” but the pamphlet 
noted that it “tends to believe” that cross-ownership among media forms inhibits 
diversity. 
 
Public access channels 
Other advocacy groups urged franchise authorities to require cable systems to set aside 
channel capacity for public access. This would give people in a community an 
unrestricted right to either air programs they had produced or to speak out live. Open 
Channel was one of the leading organizations promoting the concept. Demands for public 
access channels eventually came to be grouped together with the demands of educational 
groups and local governments for set-aside channel capacity; thus, the concept of “PEG 
channels” (Public access, Education, Government) was born. PEG channels were a 
distributional issue in which advocates asserted non-economic, noncommercial criteria as 
a mechanism for allocation of channel capacity, one of the most vital resources of the 
new distribution medium of cable. Needless to say, this distributional principle was 
                                                 
30
 Dean, a former advertising agency executive, was involved in communication policy also on behalf of 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). According to our data on Congressional testimony ADA was 
one of the most frequent testifying organizations on CIP issues in the 1969 – 1971 time frame. 
31
 The separation of content and conduit actually was endorsed by a Presidential Cabinet Committee 
appointed by Nixon and run by Clay Whitehead in 1974. See Whitehead, C. T. (1974). Cable: Report to the 
President. Washington, DC, Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications: 122. 
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stoutly resisted by most of those who owned and invested in cable systems; they wanted 
to allocate channel capacity on the basis of optimizing the economic value and 
profitability of the cable system. However, cable system developers were willing to 
bargain with local authorities to win franchises, and this gave PEG advocates leverage. 
The outcome of this clash of allocation principles was a policy bargain in which PEG 
channels won an institutionalized right to exist but were contained as a small minority of 
total channel capacity. Longer term, the impact of PEG channels was minimized not so 
much by their smaller channel capacity as by their inability to compete successfully with 
commercial channels for finance and viewers’ attention and allegiance. Unlike the 
market-based system with which it was competing, PEG channels lacked an 
institutionalized capacity for economic sustainability, strategic resource allocation and 
self-promotion. As an unorganized commons, public access channels had no way to 
create a feedback loop between audiences and producers that would direct more resources 
and air time to programs, ideas and formats that the public responded to and wanted to 
see more of. The commercial sector of cable, of course, did have such a mechanism (the 
whole apparatus of ratings, advertising sales, premium subscription rates and the like). 
Here again, we see the appealing normative vision of the media activists unable to 
successfully translate itself into sustainable economic institutions. 
 
Technological mandates 
Cable was probably the first communications arena in which public interest advocates 
and some elements of technical expert opinion tried to anticipate the future and use public 
policy to define the pace of development and the technical architecture of the medium.32 
Studies by the Sloan Commission, the Markle Foundation and Ford-funded RAND 
Corporation studies contributed to an anticipatory set of expectations about cable 
technology. (Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, 1971; Smith, 1972)  Inspired 
by notions of what cable systems could do technically, many advocates proposed to use 
franchise requirements or FCC regulations to accelerate or require the deployment of 
advanced features.  At a minimum, advocates called for capacity requirements; e.g., 
systems should have at least twice as many channels as required to carry local broadcast 
stations. (Powledge, 1972)  At the other extreme, some commentators in the early 1970s 
heaped upon cable TV systems expectations for capabilities that were not fully realized 
until the advent of the Internet twenty-five years later. Forrest Chisman (1977, 83) of the 
Markle Foundation wrote, “Typically these groups wanted the cable industry to assume 
in the near future the responsibility of implementing innovative services which earlier 
visionaries had said it would only eventually provide. Among the services which these 
groups hoped the FCC would demand were two-way communications, reserved channels, 
funding for public access, and interconnection.” Chisman mentions the UCC Office of 
Communications and Open Channel as groups actively lobbying to require cable systems 
to be more advanced. 
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 Don LeDuc noted sardonically that “the studies and reports of the proponents of cable tend to blur the 
crucial distinction between potentiality and actuality; they predict the imminent emergence of a nationwide 
80-channel coaxial system, while the cable television industry of the early 1970s…still furnishes less than a 
dozen channels to [an average] 2,300 subscribers [in small markets and rural areas].”Le Duc, D. R. (1973). 
Cable Television and the FCC. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, p. 5. 
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The Legacy of Cable Advocacy 
Far-reaching visions of what cable could be had to contend with the gritty realities of 
business and local franchising politics. For the most part, politics as usual was the order 
of the day. Cable franchises were monopolies and potentially lucrative. In awarding 
monopoly franchises, cities would often “soak” cable operators to give themselves more 
revenue and perks and then allow local rates to be set higher to recover costs. 
Combinations of prominent local citizens with inside ties to local government teamed up 
to apply for exclusive franchises. (Smith, 1972, Chapter 6)  
 
For all its excesses and failings, cable-related activism contained the germ of a 
homegrown communications-information movement. Presaging the Internet, it 
contributed to the rise of a techno-culture animated by a belief in the transformative 
powers of interactive communication. It brought the cultural and content elements of 
policy into close connection with ideas about industry structure and regulation. 
Engagement with cable development was also the first to raise privacy issues in the 
modern sense of a concern with the use of the technology for surveillance. (Smith, 1972, 
98)  Cable activists also seem to have suffered from a problem that continues to dog 
communication-information activists to this day: they had to convince people that their 
focus on what seemed to be an obscure, technical policy specialty should be of interest to 
the broad masses of people. (One must keep in mind that cable television in the 1970s, 
unlike today, reached a small minority of the public.) 
4.4 Four Major Institutional Changes 
The ferment from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s produced additional institutional 
changes distinctive to communications and information. We consider the Freedom of 
Information Act and Public Broadcasting to be two such changes.33 There were also 
important changes in copyright and privacy law during this period. And yet, with the 
exception of the ACLU, which was deeply involved in privacy issues, the latter two areas 
of information and communications policy were not central to the media advocates’ 
agenda. 
 
Freedom of Information Act 
Enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was the first law to establish an 
effective legal right of citizen access to government information. The bill, passed by an 
overwhelming margin, emerged from widespread recognition that the growth of the 
federal bureaucracy led to a need for more transparency in government. The existing 
Administrative Procedures Act was perceived as inadequate and problematic with respect 
to information access. FOIA was authored and sponsored by Congressman John Emerson 
Moss of California, a leading consumer advocate who also authored the law that 
established the Consumer Product Safety Commission. In 1955 Moss began a crusade of 
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 Prohibitions on cigarette advertising might also be considered a noteworthy institutional change in media 
policy. In 1970, after years of maneuvering between the Federal Trade Commission, health advocates and 
the cigarette industry, Congress acted to ban all cigarette advertising on television and radio. This can be 
characterized as an extension of the consumerist-health movement to media policy more than a change in 
media institutions as such, although its economic impact on advertising-supported broadcasters was 
profound.  
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investigations, reports and hearings on government information policy, and after 11 years 
his efforts were rewarded. In the ensuing 38 years, citizens, scholars, and reporters have 
used FOIA to obtain vital information; indeed, FOIA complemented and empowered the 
citizens groups formed later under the new model. By developing expertise in the rights 
granted to them under the law and using that expertise to sift through government 
documents, they could play a more effective role in formulating policy, reacting to 
government initiatives, or countering lies told by government or business.  
 
FOIA and the principles behind it are mainstays of Jeffersonian liberal democracy, and 
have long-term historical roots. The purest manifestation of those principles prior to the 
American law was the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 1766, which not only 
guaranteed freedom of speech and the press but also enabled free public access to any 
official document. The Swedish Publicity Principle was not modified until a 1937 
Secrecy Act, passed during the dark hours of fascism, but many aspects of the 1766 law 
are still in place today. 
 
Although FOIA was supported by the ACLU, a more important role in its passage was 
played by professional and commercial interest groups associated with broadcasting and 
publishing. Many of these groups, such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
Sigma Delta Chi, National Press Photographers, American Newspapers Publishers 
Association, and National Newspaper Association, set up “Freedom of Information 
Committees” to support the law. FOIA was also supported by the New York State 
Publishers Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, and the American Bar 
Association. 
 
Since the 1980s, the US government has tightened up its control of information and 
carved out numerous exemptions to FOIA. Still, the Act qualifies as a major institutional 
change, as it does permit citizens groups to obtain valuable information about the 
activities of government. State versions of FOIA laws have also been passed, and the 
concept has been occasionally taken up by non-US polities.  
 
Public Television 
A second major institutional change was the Public Television Act of 1967. The public 
broadcasting law emerged from a Carnegie Foundation Commission report and several 
Ford Foundation initiatives, as well as pressure from educational broadcasters. The 
Carnegie Commission had been formed in 1965. Its January 26, 1967 report concluded 
that “a well-financed and well-directed educational television system, substantially larger 
and far more pervasive and effective than that which now exists in the United States, 
must be brought into being if the full needs of the American public are to be served.” The 
report called the public television proposal “a system that in its totality will become a 
new and fundamental institution in American culture.” Only 10 months after the release 
of the Carnegie report (November 1967), a new law creating the Corporation for Public 
Television (CPT) was passed. CPT (later the Corporation for Public Broadcasting) began 
operation in 1968.  
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It is difficult to know how much general public support there was for public television. 
We do know, however, that public broadcasting resulted from the cultural concerns of 
educated elites dissatisfied with the lowest common denominator programs of the 
commercial mass media, and from pressure generated by educational programmers 
seeking better distribution for their content. (Pepper, 1975)  The new media advocacy 
groups played no role in its founding because they did not exist yet, although some of 
them would later help resist budget cuts. It seems likely also that the older consumer 
groups and listeners associations helped to generate a climate of opinion critical of 
commercial broadcasting and favorable to a major reallocation of resources to a 
noncommercial alternative. Like FOIA, public broadcasting has suffered reversals, 
mainly attributable to financing issues, but must still be considered a lasting institutional 
change. 
 
Privacy and Intellectual Property 
Two other important laws affecting communication and information policy passed in this 
period. One was the Privacy Act of 1974. Colin Bennett (1992) documents how in 
economically advanced Western democracies the impact of computer technology on 
privacy and personal data moved from “an abstract intellectual concern” to “a contentious 
political issue” in the late 1960s - early 1970s. The development in national governments 
of large-scale databases with records on individuals, the automation of census procedures 
around 1970, and the release of popular books on computers and privacy34 all contributed 
to the emergence of what Bennett describes “as an international policy community.” The 
environment of technological uncertainty associated with computerization of records, he 
writes, “produced a strong motivation…for cross-national lesson-drawing, which 
stimulated frequent interaction among a tightly-knit community of mainly legal 
specialists.” However, for the most part this transnational issue network was limited to 
data protection issues and did not advance a comprehensive agenda for 
telecommunications and media policy. Privacy-related popular activism had to wait until 
the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 6). 
 
In the United States, from the beginning of 1965 to the end of 1974 there were 47 
separate sets of congressional hearings and reports on privacy-related issues. The 1974 
Privacy Act in the US was passed to ensure that government records were accurate, 
timely, complete, and relevant. The law originally proposed to create a new federal 
Privacy Commission; but President Gerald Ford prevented that by objecting to the 
creation of more bureaucracy. (Diffie & Landau, 1998, 127) Passage of the Privacy Act 
and other privacy-related laws were also fueled by the need to impose restraints on the 
use of electronic surveillance by the FBI and CIA. This followed exposure of the abuses 
during the civil rights and antiwar movements. Although privacy issues began to be 
discussed in connection with the rise of cable television in the early 1970s, for the most 
part the new media advocacy groups did not consider privacy-related discourse a core 
part of their message. While the civil rights and antiwar groups that had been abused by 
the FBI played a significant role in generating opposition to government surveillance, and 
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 Bennett (1992, 54) singles out Vance Packard’s The Naked Society, 1964; Myron Brenton’s The Privacy 
Invaders, 1964; Alan Westin’s Privacy and Freedom, 1967, and Arthur Miller’s Assault on Privacy, 1971. 
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of course the ACLU was a major source of testimony and expertise, compared to the 
digital era there was little interaction between privacy and mass media issues. 
 
Another important change was the Copyright Act of 1976. Like the privacy legislation, 
this major revision of copyright protection took place in reaction to technological 
changes: the rise of the photocopying machine and of cable television. The new media 
advocates, however, played no role in its formulation or passage.35 Without further 
research it is difficult to determine whether the Copyright Act as a whole can be 
characterized as a significant institutional change. No marked redistribution of wealth is 
immediately evident; it appears to be more of a brokered compromise among various 
professional and commercial interest groups. However, the law did much to 
institutionalize concepts of fair use, particularly with respect to photocopying printed 
media. 
 
It is notable that FOIA and public television preceded the growth of organized media 
advocacy groups, and that the other two laws (the Privacy and Copyright Acts) did not 
involve communication activists as a major part of the picture. At this time, the field was 
still fragmented into separate issue networks.  
4.5 License Renewals and Institutional Change  
Undoubtedly, the media activism of the 1970s was successful and influential insofar as it 
maintained and marginally extended the gains of civil rights and related social 
movements. But its success in transforming the economic basis of the media, or the 
institutional structure of communications regulation, was much more limited. When 
compared to other aspects of the advocacy movements of the late 1960s and 1970s, 
especially environmentalism and consumerism, the changes achieved in the media sphere 
seem modest and often temporary.  
 
Action for Children’s Television (ACT) was one of the few citizens groups that mounted 
a sustained attempt to add new regulatory content to the FCC’s agenda. Formed as a local 
group in 1968, it went national with substantial foundation funding in 1970. ACT sought 
to improve the quality of children’s programming and eventually came to seek an 
outright ban on advertising on children’s programs as the means to that end. ACT 
succeeded in gaining significant publicity and a sympathetic hearing from the FCC’s 
chairman at the time, Dean Burch (a Nixon appointee). The FCC was prompted to hold a 
rulemaking on children’s programming – one of the few rulemakings directly attributable 
to a non-industry group in this period. However, in July 1972 the FCC investigation came 
to the unsurprising conclusion that a commercial broadcast regime dependent on 
advertising revenue would eliminate most children’s programs if ads on them were 
banned. The overall impact of the ACT effort was ameliorative rather than structural: the 
National Association of Broadcasters was pressured to amend its advertising code to 
reduce by about 25 percent the minutes per hour of advertising on children’s programs. 
(Guimary, 1975) 
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 Not a single CIP-related public interest group testified in the hearings on the new Copyright Act.  
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In other areas of content regulation, neither liberal-moderate-conservative coalitions 
concerned with televised violence, nor conservatives focused on sex and traditional 
values, nor joint feminist-conservative action against pornography, succeeded in 
institutionalizing their norms. The standards of sexual content acceptable on broadcast 
television moved toward ever-greater permissiveness, although there is still a disjunction 
between the more-regulated broadcast world and cable.  
 
The United Church of Christ v. FCC decisions did, for a while, create an important 
institutional change in the relationship between citizens and regulators. The media 
activism that followed in its wake infused the norms of the civil rights and women’s 
movements into the management, employment, and programming of the broadcast media. 
As Horwitz (2003) observes, the civil rights movement gave the FCC’s vague mandate to 
foster “diversity” in programming a specific regulatory substance (racial or gender 
representation in content and hiring). Hence, the FCC was fairly active in translating 
those norms into regulations affecting broadcaster conduct.36  
 
Some social science studies of broadcast license challenges seem to indicate that the 
efforts of advocacy groups were counterproductive in the regulatory context.37 While this 
data is an interesting reflection on the effectiveness of advocacy in the regulatory 
process, for license challenges to be effective it was not necessary for the FCC itself to 
act. The tornado of petitions to deny led to direct bargaining between the license holder 
and the challengers. Major adjustments in employment and programming practices were 
made without involving the FCC. (Chisman, 1977; Guimary, 1975; Montgomery, 1989; 
Slavin & Pendleton, 1983) 
 
But the bargaining between advocacy groups and the licensees raised an important 
institutional issue in itself – one that goes to the heart of the model of participatory 
democracy implicit in the organized advocacy of the period. The simple fact is that the 
petition to deny was an institutionalized possibility open to those with venal intentions as 
well as good intentions. As one contemporary observer noted, it created some “potential 
for improper and excessive payments to citizens groups and the danger of promoting 
extortionist behavior.” (Grundfest, 1977, 87)  More broadly, the FCC found that its 
(nominal) role as guardian and monitor of the public interest could be usurped by private 
agreements between the licensee and a challenger. This raised fundamental issues about 
how the public interest was to be defined. Should it be defined through essentially 
entrepreneurial actions of contending advocacy groups claiming to represent the public or 
some portion of it? Or should appointed governmental regulators, subject to judicial 
oversight, scrutinize these deals and apply standards based on interpretation of the law? 
Which method is more “democratic?” The FCC (predictably) tilted away from the 
participatory ideal. It initiated a series of proceedings regarding whether it should 
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 However, because the changes were only embodied in regulations, never in legislation, they have proven 
to be reversible by the Courts as conservative thinkers have gained positions and preeminence in the law. 
(Horwitz, 2003) 
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 These studies contrasted proceedings in which public interest groups intervened against a broadcaster 
with proceedings in which there was no public intervention. The data show that the FCC was more likely to 
take away a license or fine the broadcaster in proceedings where there was no intervention by advocacy 
groups. (Linker, 1983; McLauchlan, 1977) 
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supervise or approve agreements between broadcasters and challenging 
groups.(Grundfest, 1977)  The FCC proceedings produced two Final Report and Orders 
in 1975 and 1976 regulating, respectively, agreements and reimbursements between 
broadcast licensees and the public.38 
 
Our point here is that petitions to deny and similar forms of public intervention could 
never form a stable basis for a public interest media system. A license renewal challenge 
is a precipitous and conflictual act; in essence, it is a struggle to completely expropriate 
the incumbent holder of a valuable right. The rationale for viewing license challenges as 
a policy tool was expressed well by Cheryl Leanza of the Media Access Project, in the 
convening reviewing an earlier draft of this report: 
 
[License renewal challenges] could have led to a change in societal norms with 
respect to the public’s attitude toward the mass media. The public could perceive 
that if the news did not reflect them, or what they perceived as truth, they could 
not just accept that vision as real or valid, but take action to challenge this. The 
[renewal challenge] changed the interaction between the people with wealth and 
power (broadcast station owners) and the citizens and viewers.   
 
The problem with this perspective is that there are many different groups with completely 
different, usually incompatible notions of what the news “should” look like. If all of them 
can threaten the economic existence of a broadcaster, freedom and diversity of expression 
is thwarted, not helped. Challenges of what constitutes “truth” could just as easily come 
from people with wealth and power who feel threatened by views of reality broadcast by 
critical but weaker groups. Such exposure simply leads to constant contention among 
social groups to impose their views on the rest of society.  
 
Deeper questions can be raised about the long-term sustainability of license challenges as 
a mechanism for public accountability. When a property right (the broadcast license) with 
high commercial and political value is involved, an incumbent will fight like hell to keep 
it. Thus, one immediate effect of the UCC litigation was that virtually every year from 
1969 to 1974, broadcasters tried to get legislation increasing their certainty over the 
license. By 1974, broadcasters successfully prodded Congress to propose legislation 
extending the term of the license from 3 years to 5 years.39  
 
One could explain this as simply business interests getting the upper hand. A more 
accurate way to look at it, however, focuses on the tendency of social institutions to 
gravitate toward more predictable, coordinated structures. Short-term uncertainty and 
unpredictability may be a necessary concomitant of social change; long-term 
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 Final Report and Order in the Matter of Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 
Docket 20495, FCC 75-1359, December 19.1975; Final Report and Order in the Notice of Inquiry and 
Proposed Rulemaking in the Matter of Reimbursement for the Legitimate and Prudent Expenses of a Public 
Interest Group for a Consultancy to a Broadcaster in Certain Instances, Docket 19518, FCC 72-473, June 7, 
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 A few years later, the Reagan Administration FCC instituted “postcard” renewal and abolished the need 
for community ascertainment of programming needs, making the broadcast license a much more secure 
property right and the paradigm of supply more commercial. (See Chapter 5) 
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unpredictability, lack of certainty as a fixture of business, is extremely costly and rarely 
serves the public interest. Institutional arrangements will inexorably equilibrate on 
stability in assigning rights. And in the long run, whoever has the most to gain from 
stability and certainty is bound to invest enough in litigation and/or the political process 
to get it. In other words, there will always be an incumbent bias. Except in rare moments 
of social turmoil or the most extreme forms of malfeasance or monopoly domination, 
public authorities will be loath to yank valuable resources away from their incumbent 
holders. This has been proven true of similar forms of media interventions, e.g. 
challenges to cable TV franchise renewals.  
 
Finally, the broadcast license was a fertile point for organization only insofar as it was an 
extremely scarce and limited resource awarded to private users as a trust laden with 
public interest obligations. The proliferation of alternative means of distributing 
television or radio content has undermined the broadcaster’s special status as a “public 
trustee.”  
 
To conclude, license renewal challenges offer a mixed legacy. As a short-term 
mechanism for injecting civil rights norms into the broadcasting industry, they were 
effective and justifiable. As a long-term mechanism for promoting a diverse and free 
mass media, they were problematical from a First Amendment standpoint and probably 
unsustainable as a long-term process. 
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5. The 1980s: Liberalization and Seeds of Change 
 
The 1980s was characterized by major changes in both the political climate and the type 
of communication-information policy issues under consideration. Public contention over 
the content of the mass media continued, but the emergent “information society” was 
increasing the importance of CIP. As this happened, economic and regulatory issues 
associated with technological change assumed center stage. The media activists of the 
1970s were not well prepared to handle this shift in the terms of the policy debate. They 
were mostly on the defensive during this period.40  
 
But the decade also planted the seeds of a new kind of CIP activism. Computer 
professionals and technologists organizing around computer-related policy issues show 
up in the organizational population of the 1980s for the first time. A decade later the rise 
of computer-related activism would produce major changes in the topical focus of CIP 
advocacy, the composition of the population, congressional testimony patterns, and mode 
of advocacy (see next chapter).  
 
This chapter begins its discussion of the 1980s with an overview of organizational 
foundings and the general population ecology (section 5.1). It then discusses advocacy 
related to content (section 5.2). Next, liberalization of telecommunications (section 5.3) 
and broadcasting (section 5.4) are considered. Section 5.5 analyzes the battles over cable 
regulation. Section 5.6 describes the early computer-oriented advocacy and activism. 
5.1 The Organizational Ecology of the 1980s 
The 1980s were perceived by many of the activists themselves as a period of 
retrenchment and defensiveness among activist organizations.41 Although we lack 
systematic data, it is probably true that funding from liberal foundations was not as 
readily available, and it is certainly true that the political climate was less favorable for 
liberal groups. In terms of organizational foundings, however, our data indicate that the 
period from 1979 to 1985 was one of the most active in the entire study. An average of 7 
new CIP advocacy organizations formed every year, and during the whole decade 59 new 
organizations were founded. It was the elevation of the death rate from 1977 to 1987 that 
is new. The main difference between the 1980s and the 1960s and 1970s is that the 
overall size of the population stopped growing rapidly. The total population flattened out 
at around 100 organizations. The population started to approach the social “carrying 
capacity” – the upper limit on the cumulative total of organizations devoted to CIP that 
the surrounding society would support.  
 
Also during the 1980s, the ideological composition of the advocacy organization 
population shifted in the conservative direction. During the 1970s, 57% of the 
                                                 
40
 It should be noted that the activities of public interest groups during the 1980s are not as well 
documented in the secondary literature as the broadcast-oriented activism in the 1970s. 
41
 One contemporary observed that what had once been a fairly robust media reform infrastructure had 
“dissipated” by the early 1980s, with only a few survivors holding down the fort. Interview with Kathy 
Montgomery, Feb. 7, 2003. 
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organizational observations were classified as liberal or socialist, and only 15% as 
conservative. In the 1980s, the conservative organizational observations jumped to 21% 
and the left-liberal declined to 50%.  
 
The decade is correlated with a major change in the policy environment; Charts 5.1 and 
5.2 document the dramatic shift in the nature of the CIP issues considered by Congress. 
Chart 5.1 shows that the number of hearings devoted to the three main preoccupations of 
the 1970s – broadcast policy, privacy, and freedom of information – declined steadily 
throughout the 1980s from its peak in 1975. In contrast, Chart 5.2 shows 
telecommunication infrastructure-related hearings rising from consistently under 10 in 
the 1970s to a peak of 56 in 1989.42 
 
With such major changes in the focus of communications information policy, one would 
expect to see elevated death rates among public interest groups. In Chapter 3 we 
indicated that the population of public interest advocacy organizations tends to adapt in 
the Darwinian manner. Old organizations suited to old conditions die off while new ones 
grounded in the new conditions are founded. Trade and professional groups, in contrast, 
are more likely to adapt through continuous modification of the behavior, membership 
and agenda of established organizations.  
 
Chart 5.1 
Hearings on FOIA, Broadcasting & Privacy, 1970s-1980s
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42
 It should be noted that most of the hearings categorized under multiple search terms involved duplication 
of the terms “telecommunications regulation” with the term “telephone” or “cable TV” or “computers and 
telecommunications.” 
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Chart 5.2 
 
U.S. Congressional Hearings on Telecom Infrastructure-Related Topics, 1974 - 1990 
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Throughout the 1980s, mass media content attracted the most attention from CIP 
advocates, as it did in the 1970s. Exactly half of the organizations in the total population 
we have identified are classified as part of the public discourse about content – only a one 
percent decrease from the 1970s. However, the survival rate of content-oriented 
organizations established in the 1980s was quite low, as Table 5.1 (next section) 
documents. Only four of the 18 organizations formed in the 1980s and primarily 
concerned with content still existed in 2003.  
 
Surprisingly, given the importance of the AT&T divestiture and cable television 
regulation, not many new public interest organizations devoted to telecommunications 
infrastructure economics and policy were created during this period. Only two, or 
arguably three, new organizations focused on those issues appear on the list.43  
                                                 
43
 The Telecommunications Research and Action Committtee (TRAC) was formed in 1983 when the old 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting was reoriented to concentrate on telecommunications issues. 
Concerned Citizens for Universal Service was a reaction to the rate rebalancing of the AT&T divestiture 
and may have been a telephone industry front group. Alliance for Public Technology, formed in 1989, 
focused on telecom policy but was more a part of the public dialogue about access to infrastructure 
characteristic of the NII debate of the early 1990s.  
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5.2 The Content Wars, Continued 
The growth of mass media channels and content production in the 1980s intensified 
competition for viewers. Media outlets responded with programming that was more 
controversial and pushed the boundaries of established norms regarding taste, violence 
and sexuality. Quite apart from the relaxation of FCC licensing standards (see section 5.4 
below), pressure to attract audiences in a more competitive and diversified environment 
worked against traditional self-regulatory program standards. (Hill & Beaver, 1991)  In 
the incumbent networks, standards and practices departments were cut back by 25% 
between 1986 and 1987. (Montgomery, 1989)  Newer media outlets entering the market 
in the 1980s, such as Fox and TBS, did not have formal standards for the review of 
programming.  
 
Table 5.1  Content-Mode Advocacy Groups Formed in the 1980s 
 
Organization Name Founded Disbanded 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee  1980 2001 
Asian Media Coalition 1980 1989 
National Coalition on Television Violence  1980  
Alternative to the New York Times Committee 1981 2001 
Coalition for Better Television 1981 1985 
Citizens Against Pornography 1982 1993 
Foundation for Moral Restoration 1982 2001 
National Coalition Against Pornography 1983 2001 
Citizens for Media Responsibility Without Law 1984 1999 
Feminists Fighting Pornography 1984 1997 
Media Watch  1984  
Project Smart 1984 1987 
Fairness in Media  1985 1995 
Parents Music Resource Center  1985 2000 
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting  1986  
Institute for Media Analysis  1986 1997 
Strategies for Media Literacy 1988 1999 
Children Now  1988  
 
Whereas the ‘70s were dominated by left-liberal content advocacy, during the 1980s 
conservative groups were equally likely to mobilize around media bias and the 
emergence of more controversial, sexual or violent programming. But while the left-
liberal activism of the 1970s had died down, its cultural pressure had not been eliminated. 
It had, in fact, been internalized and institutionalized within the major content networks’ 
standards and practices departments and among scriptwriters and program producers. 
Initially, as Montgomery (1989, p. 59-64) explains, networks such as NBC hired 
advocacy groups as “technical consultants” when developing programs that might be 
perceived as objectionable. Eventually, however, there was more integration between 
network elites and ethnic groups, and minority hiring replaced consultations with outside 
groups. Relationships with advocacy groups were institutionalized; standards and 
practices executives, according to Montgomery (1989, 199) became “uniquely skilled at 
spotting a word, a phrase, or a plot sequence that would evoke a negative reaction from 
any one of the two hundred or so groups that had made themselves known to the 
networks.”  
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Religious conservatives on the other hand adopted different and more confrontational 
tactics in the 1980s. Donald Wildmon’s Moral Majority bypassed network standards and 
practices departments and focused on boycotting advertisers. The founding of the Parents 
Music Resource Center by Tipper Gore in 1985 indicated the growing importance of 
digital content as a packaged commodity. The group mobilized around offensive lyrics 
published to young people on music CDs and came to advocate rating of published 
content. 
 
Over the long term, however, the nature of mass media content was being driven more by 
the actions of consumers, producers and advertisers in the commercial marketplace than 
by political activism and regulation. Content rating is the perfect bargaining result of 
content-focused advocacy in a market context. It adopts the paradigm of product labeling 
and gives informed consumers the right to make their own choices. The new market 
paradigm did create some space for activism: advertisers have a strong natural incentive 
to avoid alienating sizable segments of the audience. Even without government 
regulation, protests, petitions and boycotts by advocacy groups can scare advertisers into 
withdrawing support for a program. Advocacy was recognized by networks, producers 
and advertisers alike to have an effect on the norms governing mass media content (Hill 
& Beaver, 1991), but it served more as a minor adjustment to the prevailing directions 
dictated by the market. 
 
On issues where society is divided, the diversity of opinion usually makes content-
oriented advocacy a zero sum game. In cases such as homosexuality, abortion, or 
portrayals of controversial politicians, programs that satisfy one ideological point of view 
are bound to anger those with opposing views. In the 1980s portrayals of gays on TV 
series like L.A. Law and thirtysomething won support from the Gay and Lesbian Alliance 
Against Defamation, but outraged the American Family Association. On the other hand, 
truly dominant social norms will be reinforced by content advocacy. Few groups would 
form to actively speak out in favor of gratuitous violence or pornography on prime time 
television, or to promote positive portrayals of narcotics use. Thus, content-oriented 
activism around dominant social norms can be effective but actually works against the 
airing of diverse views. Truly challenging programs will attract political challenges that 
may result in their withdrawal, segregation into time zones that restrict access, or similar 
restrictive measures. 
 
When groups attempt to resist content-oriented advocacy’s reinforcement of dominant 
norms, they adopt the advocacy mode of individual rights. Defenses of content that 
threatens dominant norms will take the form of anti-censorship campaigns or promotion 
of individual rights to free and diverse expression. In 1980, liberal television producer 
Norman Lear founded People for the American Way as a counter to the Moral Majority, 
adopting the language of constitutional rights. Rock Out Censorship was formed in 1989 
as a counter to Tipper Gore’s campaign against music lyrics. In American society at least, 
rights advocacy trumps content-mode advocacy.  
 
Most of the media activist organizations created in the 1970s, and many of the new ones 
formed in the 1980s, did not participate in the infrastructure regulation battles. But the 
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changes in economic regulation were fomenting a revolution in communication and 
information industries that would do more to define the terms of content delivery than 
any of the policies and regulations sought by content-oriented advocates. 
5.3 AT&T Divestiture & Telecom Liberalization 
From the second half of the 1970s until 1996 the communications infrastructure of the 
nation went through systematic and sustained institutional change. In 
telecommunications, the model of a monopoly utility subject to public interest regulation 
was replaced by the idea of a competitive marketplace guided by norms of efficiency, 
consumer choice and entrepreneurial freedom, although substantial regulation remained. 
Cable television and broadcasting also went through various levels of deregulation. 
 
Telecommunications liberalization – the most appropriate label for this process44 – 
started in the U.S. but came to include virtually every developed country and many 
developing ones as well. (Drake, 2001)  The liberalization trend constituted a global 
institutional change that was as significant – and as irreversible – as civil rights and 
environmentalism. For the most part, left-liberal activists were on the defensive during 
this period. Although that change in the underlying policy paradigm has now run its 
course, many current activists still have not progressed beyond the regulation-
deregulation dialectic set in motion during the 1980s.  
 
Liberalization of the communications industry had its roots in a scholarly critique of 
business regulation that had been building for two decades. Critical examination of 
regulatory agencies and processes by academics in the 1960s and 70s discovered that 
regulatory agencies often were captured by the regulated industry. Established businesses 
themselves often created the political demand for regulation and other forms of 
government intervention. The effect of regulation was often to protect incumbent 
businesses from competition. More generally, the new political economy held that it was 
wrong to view government action as somehow always in the interest of the public and 
exempt from self-interested behavior. Regulators, bureaucrats, politicians and economic 
interest groups advocating regulation have something to gain from their actions, and 
much could be learned about government behavior and appropriate policy by keeping that 
in mind. Far from being a rightwing conspiracy, that critique was rooted in research 
spanning the spectrum from leftist (See the work of Gabriel Kolko on early railroad 
regulation), to mainstream liberal (Marver Bernstein), to free market “Chicago School” 
thinkers (Ronald Coase, Harold Demsetz, George Stigler). The essential outlines of this 
critique were accepted by liberal as well as conservative legislators and regulators, and 
the ideas came into prominence in the mid-1970s.45 There was a newfound appreciation 
                                                 
44
 We use the term “liberalization” rather than “deregulation” because deregulation of prices, exit and entry 
is typically only one part of the process. Many aspects of telecommunications have been regulated as a 
result of liberalization; e.g., interconnection, numbering, and network infrastructure unbundling.  Also, the 
divestiture of AT&T itself involved an act of fairly aggressive antitrust intervention in the industry’s 
market structure. 
45
 Liberal Democratic FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson supported the early admission of new entrants 
into common carrier markets. Deregulator Fred Kahn was appointed CAB chair by President Carter, and 
the bill deregulating airlines in 1978 was sponsored by Ted Kennedy. Henry Geller, a former FCC Counsel, 
NTIA head and policy analyst funded by the Ford Foundation, came to support eliminating broadcasters’ 
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for values such as efficiency, competition, consumer choice, and innovation, and for the 
costs and problems associated with government action. 
 
In short, liberalization constituted a countervailing social movement that introduced new 
ideas and new norms into communications policy making. The new norms were 
politically salable and backed by academically respectable research, as well as solid 
experience with the perversities of monopolies and regulation. Just as in the 1960s new 
norms pertaining to consumer protection, civil rights and environmental protection cut 
across multiple policy domains at once, making it difficult for an unprepared business 
community to fend off change, so the new norms of economic liberalization cut across 
multiple communication policy domains at once, making it impossible for the small 
community of pro-regulation media activists to fight on all the relevant fronts. 
 
The AT&T divestiture and the 20-year process of revising the legislation and regulations 
structuring competition in telecommunications were set in motion by contention among 
economic interests. Alternative suppliers of equipment and services allied themselves 
with major business users to demand greater choice and openness in the public 
telecommunications network. (Brock, 1994; Cowhey, 1990)  Incumbent telephone 
monopolies and state regulators resisted the changes. The economic stakes were vast; at 
this time telephone monopolies were often the largest single enterprises in a nation. 
 
During this period economists assumed the lead role in offering a vision of the public 
interest. The theoretical and analytical tools of economists (especially the law and 
economics analysis associated with Chicago-School economists) provided the primary 
basis for comprehending the interaction of law, regulation, economics and technology. 
Economic modes of analysis filled a dire need, as regulators were confronted with 
complex technological changes and new institutional and legal problems caused by them.  
 
Media activists who were focused more on culture and content had a difficult time 
participating in this dialogue. Instead, the lead public interest role in responding to 
telecommunications liberalization was assumed by consumer organizations. Consumer 
organizations defended distributional bargains favoring local telephone consumers at the 
expense of long distance users, while supporting the shift to a competitive model when it 
delivered benefits to residential users. Consumer organizations also fought for a pro-
consumer mix of regulation and competition in the cable television industry. In the 
complex mix of business interests contending over telecom policy, they found that 
coalitions and alliances with different business groups could provide the leverage for 
influencing policy. They sided with newspaper interests against telephone companies to 
prevent the latter from entering information services; with cable companies against 
telephone companies or sometimes vice-versa; with competing smaller telephone 
companies against larger ones; etc. 
 
Initially in the late 1970s, AT&T co-opted some consumer and advocacy groups by 
claiming that a regulated monopoly using cross-subsidies promoted universal service and 
                                                                                                                                                 
public trustee requirements and in its place imposing a spectrum fee on stations and auctions for all new 
frequency assignments, using the money to support noncommercial telecommunications. 
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made local telephone service more affordable. Consumer advocate Sharon Nelson, who 
later became head of the Washington State Utility Commission, laid the foundations for a 
break with the traditional pro-monopoly view. Nelson was a Carter-style Democrat and 
believed that economic deregulation could be a progressive policy with the right 
safeguards.  
 
Consumer organizations had a substantial impact on the AT&T divestiture and its 
aftermath. But their agenda, as noted before, was to moderate the distributional effects. 
They wanted to preserve low rates for local telephone subscriptions and continue to 
allocate the joint and common costs of the network according to the equity principles that 
had been used by regulators in the past, rather than the efficiency principles advocated by 
economists. They were influential in Congress because they were resisting rate shocks 
that voters would not like. Moreover, they were in a position to take advantage of 
divisions among industrial lobbyists.  
 
The Lifeline and Linkup programs exemplify the type of success consumer organizations 
achieved. In the early 1980s, economists and regulators had proposed a “Subscriber Line 
Charge,” an immediate increase in monthly local telephone subscription rates designed to 
facilitate a cost-based realignment of local and long distance rates. The SLC as originally 
proposed would have doubled local rates for most consumers. Organizations such as 
Consumer Federation of America, Public Citizen's Congress Watch and Consumers 
Union filed comments at the FCC opposing the SLC, and requesting creation of a 
program to directly subsidize local rates for low-income consumers – a program that 
became known as “Lifeline.” Eventually the SLC was reduced and its implementation 
phased in over time. Later in the 1980s, targeted subsidies for phone line installation 
("Linkup America") were created. As a subsidy restricted to the needy, Lifeline and 
Linkup were more efficient than the untargeted subsidies of the old regulatory regime. 
The Consumer Union’s Gene Kimmelman feels that consumer groups deserve credit for 
making the transition to competition with “minimal consumer pain.”46 
 
The pattern is clear: the initiative for change came from economic interest groups, and 
the vision and policy model came from pro-market political economists, but advocacy 
groups had an impact on how the cost burdens were distributed.  
5.4 Broadcasting Regulation  
Liberalization of communications industries had a major impact on the U.S. public 
interest groups involved in mass communications. In the prior decade, advocacy groups 
had learned to rely heavily on the public trustee regulations to gain leverage over the 
programming, employment practices and community relations of broadcasters. 
Liberalization and deregulation eroded those forms of leverage, diminishing their ability 
to push for policy goals in the ways in which they had become accustomed.   
 
Movement toward a market paradigm was bipartisan and preceded Ronald Reagan’s 
election as President. But the election of Reagan put people into policy making positions 
                                                 
46
 Interview with Gene Kimmelman, September 30, 2002. 
 59
in the federal government who were more pro-business and more willing to take bold 
measures breaking with the past. This was especially true of the Federal Communications 
Commission, where outspoken former broadcaster Mark Fowler was appointed Chair. 
Fowler and others directly attacked the scarcity rationale that had served to justify 
regulation in the past. Noting the diversification of program outlets, they argued that 
consumers could “vote with the dial.” “The public’s interest [in programming] defines 
the public interest.” Papers in law review articles articulated a new approach to the public 
interest standard that equated the public interest with promoting a free and competitive 
marketplace. (Fowler & Brenner, 1982) 
 
In January 1981, in a move that started under Carter, the FCC eliminated rules and 
policies requiring radio programming logs, commercial time limitations, ascertainment of 
community problems, and non-entertainment programming requirements. License terms 
were extended to five years for TV and seven years for radio. In 1984, similar changes 
were made for commercial television licensees. The number of television stations a single 
entity could own was increased from 7 to 12 in 1985. From 1985 to 1987, the 
Commission found that the Fairness Doctrine undermined the First Amendment by 
inhibiting coverage of controversial issues by broadcasters, and ruled that its enforcement 
was no longer in the public interest. The decision was upheld on appeal. 
 
In one of the few case studies of CIP advocacy groups in the deregulation era, H. Kim 
(1995) examined the role of citizens groups in the Direct Broadcast Satellite proceeding 
from 1979 to 1982. The study shows that the basic contours of the debate over broadcast 
regulation had been recast in economic terms. Advocates of the new service characterized 
DBS as “a new source of video competition” and “the initiation of [a] new, innovative 
and competitive communications service for the American public.” Incumbent 
broadcasters, on the other hand, advanced a protectionist argument, complaining that 
competition from DBS would siphon away advertising revenue from local broadcasters 
and destroy localism in broadcasting.  
 
Eight citizens groups drawn from the civil rights-oriented 1970s media activism 
intervened in the DBS proceeding.47 While not opposing the introduction of DBS, their 
goal was to fit the new service into the mold of traditional broadcast public trustee 
regulation, imposing on it ownership restrictions, program diversity requirements and 
similar public interest obligations. That viewpoint failed to resonate with policy makers 
in the new conditions of the 1980s. The government and the prospective new entrants 
saw such regulation as an impediment to the development of new technologies and 
services. The advocacy groups failed to convince policy makers why new businesses 
should not be allowed to enter the market with minimal burdens, or why consumer choice 
in an expanded marketplace was not sufficient to protect consumer interests.  
                                                 
47
 NCCB, NABB, National Black Media Coalition, UCC, Citizens Communications Center, Black Citizens 
for Fair Media, Committee for Community Access, Chinese for Affirmative Action, Citizens Committee on 
the Media, and Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Latino Radio. 
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5.5 Cable Deregulation and Re-Regulation 
Cable Television was a major preoccupation of the 1980s. As a mass medium involving 
content, the media activists of the 1970s showed more interest in cable than in 
telecommunications. But in this policy arena as well, the pro-market paradigm was more 
influential. The first major institutional change was the passage of the Cable 
Communications Act of 1984. Near the end of the decade, consumer advocates 
spearheaded an attempt to re-regulate the cable industry that met with temporary success 
in 1992. 
 
The Cable Communications Act of 1984 represented an accommodation between two 
interest groups: municipal franchising authorities, represented by the National League of 
Cities, and the cable industry, represented by the National Cable Television Association 
(NCTA). NCTA was concerned about the uncertainty of franchise renewals and the rate 
regulations and franchise fees imposed on them by municipalities. The basic bargain was 
that the cable systems would be deregulated and cities would receive significant franchise 
fees. The law regularized franchise renewal procedures, capped franchise fees at 5%, and 
deregulated rates. The impact of public interest groups was felt mainly through the law’s 
institutionalization of public access channels. The law authorized local franchising 
authorities to require set-asides of channel capacity for public, educational or 
governmental (PEG) use. It also required that 10-15 percent of cable channel capacity be 
devoted to leased access.  
 
The channel access provisions represented a somewhat lopsided compromise between 
advocates of the “common carrier” concept, wherein cable system operators would serve 
as a neutral conduit for content produced by others, and the “electronic publisher” model, 
wherein cable system owners, like newspapers, actively selected which content to publish 
and promote. The parameters of this compromise were constrained by court decisions 
ruling some forms of common carrier regulation unconstitutional.48 
 
Few would argue that public access channels have revolutionized mass communication, 
as some of the more utopian advocates had hoped they would. In general they lack the 
resources for self-promotion and attract tiny audiences. Their usage by the public has 
been constrained by the need for video production equipment and facilities, and more 
fundamentally by the fact that the demand for programming has expanded to the point 
that most capable producers of programs with the potential for popularity will be picked 
up by the commercial marketplace. But public access channels continue to hang on and 
play a valued if marginal role in cable communications. The 1984 Act’s provision for 
leased access also seems to have had little effect on the industry structure; we are not sure 
why. Overall, cable has developed more as an electronic publisher than as a common 
carrier.  
 
                                                 
48
 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 1979. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 
1434 (DC Cir. 1985.  
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Following the 1984 Act’s deregulation of cable rates in January 1987, frustration with 
cable companies grew among consumers. Many local franchises were exclusive, 
shielding them from competition. Subscription rates increased by 61%, three times faster 
than inflation. The responsiveness of cable monopolies to service calls became a national 
joke.  
 
The Consumers Federation of America played a leading role in translating this consumer 
frustration into legislation. CFA’s campaign began in April 1989, when it issued a press 
release claiming that consumers were being overcharged and poorly served. It criticized 
the vertical integration between content producers and cable operators and the use of 
programming to impede head to head competition between cable systems. It proposed a 
new law re-regulating cable rates and instituting measures to promote competition. 
 
The defeat of this proposal in 1990 made Gene Kimmelman of CFA realize that he 
needed more powerful allies. Consequently, CFA enlisted broadcasters in the fight 
against the cable industry. Broadcasters now viewed cable as a dangerous competitor that 
siphoned programs and advertising away from them. They proposed that cable systems 
pay them money, known as “retransmission consent fees” for the carriage of their signal. 
A new version of the bill containing retransmission consent was co-sponsored by Senator 
John Danforth, a Missouri Republican, and eventually supported by nearly half the 
Republicans in Congress.49 The retransmission consent ploy turned Hollywood content 
producers against the bill, however. After a major political battle in which broadcaster 
interests spent almost $400,000, Hollywood $350,000 and cable interests over 
$1,000,000, the bill was passed and President Bush’s veto overridden. In April 1993 the 
FCC issued new regulations fleshing out the details of the act.  
 
In pushing for the 1992 law, Kimmelman took as a starting point industry interest group 
politics, and strategically maneuvered within them. This was marked as a notable shift of 
strategy at the time. Critics and admirers alike described CFA as engaged in a kind of 
“balance of power” politics. According to the New York Times, he “deliberately picks 
issues where he can use the money and muscle of one industry to take on another.”50 
Regarding retransmission consent, Kimmelman said “it was a deal with the devil that I 
think was not a bad deal. The only way you win on this kind of an issue is if you’ve got 
enough muscle on your side. We had the perfect combination of rural, urban, consumers 
and broadcasters. And still it wasn’t easy.”51  
 
Kimmelman’s assessment of political necessity was supported by academic research on 
PAC contributions and the 1992 cable re-regulation act. In a statistical test of influence, 
                                                 
49
 The 1992 Cable re-regulation bill: 1) Enabled local governments to regulate rates for the basic package 
of services based on FCC guidelines, and authorized the FCC to step in when they didn’t do it right. 2) Set 
minimum customer service standards; 3) Mandated retransmission consent for broadcasters; 4) prohibited 
exclusive franchises; 5) permitted local governments to operate a cable system without going through the 
franchising process; 6) required cable operators to sell programming they owned to all comers, e.g., 
satellite and wireless competitors. 
50
 Edmund Andrews, “Cable Bill Advocate Divides and Conquers,” New York Times, 27 September 1992. 
51
 Phillip Davis, “Bush Asks for Sign of Loyalty; Congress Changes the Channel,” Congressional Quarterly 
October 10, 1992, p. 3149. 
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Cohen and Hamman (2003) “detected little congressional responsiveness to constituent 
demands… .”  
 
Despite rising cable rates and consumer complaints to policy makers, it was not 
until broadcasters mobilized against cable interests to secure rebroadcasting fees 
that cable interests lost their hold on cable policy. (p. 366) 
 
The disturbing conclusion is that in the American polity (and probably in many other 
developed industrial societies) general public demand for a policy by itself is insufficient 
to create institutional changes. Organized special interests must be enlisted. That fact has 
important implications for the future of public interest advocacy.  
 
The 1992 Cable Act was hailed by liberal advocacy groups as the first major re-
regulation of an industry since Reagan was elected in 1981. However, the bill did not 
reverse and in some ways was intended to foster the long term trend toward liberalization 
of the industry. By prohibiting exclusive franchises and exclusive deals for programming, 
the bill fostered competition. Regulation was positioned as a near-term substitute for 
competition in those areas of the market still monopolized. After only three years of 
implementation, the 1992 bill was superseded by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
The new law eliminated rate regulation but retained many of the pro-competitive aspects 
of the 1992 Act.  
5.6 Early Computer Advocacy 
The 1980s contained the seeds of a new kind of CIP activism. Five organizations in 
particular represent the beginnings of a change in the organizational ecology that would 
intensify in the 1990s: the Free Software Foundation, Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility, the Public Interest Computer Association, Public Cryptography Study 
Group, and the League for Programming Freedom. FSF became a leader of the open 
source software movement. CPSR began with a focus on anti-nuclear and military issues, 
but has since grown into an international membership organization that focuses on the 
entire range of communication-information policy issues. The advocate behind PICA had 
ties to CPSR and later played a role in the formation of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Electronic Privacy Information Center. 
 
The new organizations reflect the existence of both new issues (policies related to 
computers) and a new constituency (computer-literate professionals). The members of 
these organizations were involved in programming computers, computer science 
research, and the implementation of new networking technologies and applications. Often 
they were based in research institutes, including military-funded ones, or universities. 
They were an elite group, but had a strong sense of responsibility regarding the new 
information technology they were developing. The Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM), a professional association, was one of their organizational homes. 
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Table 5.2  Computer-related organizations founded in the 1980s 
 
Organization Name Founded Disbanded 
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility 1981  
Public Cryptography Study Group 1983 1987 
Public Interest Computer Association 1983 1987 
Free Software Foundation 1985  
League for Programming Freedom 1989  
 
In the 1980s, the political battle over encryption that would define online activism in the 
1990s was already taking shape. From 1974 – 1980, the government’s intellectual 
monopoly on cryptographic knowledge and technology was broken by researchers. 
(Diffie & Landau, 1998; Levy, 2001)  The technologists who attempted to develop tools 
of privacy protection using computer technology encountered systematic opposition and 
harassment by the government. In response, they began to organize and resist. The first 
“Crypto conference” was held in 1981. The Public Cryptography Study Group was an 
expert group formed in 1983 to support liberalization of encryption. Advocacy activity 
converged around the 1987 Computer Security Act, which passed with support of 
business and civil liberties groups. The law transferred responsibility for securing the 
nation’s computer infrastructure and standards from the secretive, military oriented 
National Security Agency to the civilian National Bureau of Standards (which later 
became NIST). (Levy, 2001, 182)  Marc Rotenberg, founder of EPIC, was a staff person 
for Senator Patrick Leahy, a key proponent of this legislation, at the time. 
 
Another way in which computer professionals became a new source of energy in the CI 
policy realm is illustrated by the formation of the RISKS-Digest by Peter G. Neumann in 
August 1985. A researcher at SRI and early user of the ARPA-Internet, Neumann became 
Chair of the ACM’s Committee on Computers and Public Policy in the mid-1980s. 
RISKS-Digest was set up as an ftp-based newsletter/bulletin board system, allowing the 
community of online computer scientists to stay informed and exchange ideas about “our 
increasingly critical dependence on the use of computers.” One of the inspirations for the 
Digest and similar activities was the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, 
better known as “Star Wars,” which proposed to develop a computer-driven system to 
shoot down incoming missiles. The first issue of the RISKS-Digest quoted ACM 
President Adele Goldberger giving voice to concerns about the intersection of computer 
science with public policy:  
 
“Contrary to the myth that computer systems are infallible, in fact computer 
systems can and do fail.  Consequently, the reliability of computer-based systems 
cannot be taken for granted.  This reality applies to all computer-based systems, 
but it is especially critical for systems whose failure would result in extreme risk 
to the public. Increasingly, human lives depend upon the reliable operation of 
systems such as air traffic and high-speed ground transportation control systems, 
military weapons delivery and defense systems, and health care delivery and 
diagnostic systems.”52 
 
                                                 
52
 Communications of the ACM, February 1985 (pp. 131-133). 
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PICA was established by Marc Rotenberg as a service organization to advise public 
interest organizations on how to use computer systems. Rotenberg was also on the Board 
of Directors of CPSR in the mid-1980s. “After working for the Senate, I thought it was 
important to establish a stronger voice for NGOs interested in technology policy.” So he 
convinced the CPSR Board to establish an office in Washington and run a “Computing 
and Civil Liberties” project. One of the first activities of the new Electronic Frontiers 
Foundation in 1990 was to make a grant to the Computing and Civil Liberties project. 
 
This new constituency of computer professionals and developers, small and elite but 
strategically placed, created in the 1980s an infrastructure of human resources and online 
communication, the fruits of which would be reaped later during the privacy/crypto 
activism of the early 1990s. (See Chapter 6)  
5.7 Conclusion 
In the 1980s, CIP started to be defined as much through battles of expert ideas as through 
the demands of politically mobilized constituencies. As emphasis shifted from content to 
infrastructure, economic issues moved to the forefront of policy, but the population of 
advocacy organizations did not reflect this change. Although left-liberal media activists 
of the 1960s and 1970s successfully institutionalized many of their cultural and social 
norms, they failed to impede politically or challenge intellectually liberal/market 
economic institutions. On the contrary, a new epistemic community with liberal and 
libertarian ideas about computers and telecommunications took root in this decade. 
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6. The 1990s: The Net, Convergence and Rights 
 
In the 1990s, digital technology became the focal point of institutional change in 
communications and information. As a non-territorial medium and the vehicle for 
convergence of communication industries and media content, the Internet in particular 
was a disruptive force in policy and law. As the Internet altered institutional patterns, a 
new generation of advocacy groups came to dominate congressional testimony, and the 
mode of advocacy shifted notably. With the emergence of concepts of “cyber-rights,” 
CIP activism begins to come into its own as a movement. 
 
A key factor in energizing and sustaining cyber-activism has been advances in theory and 
ideas. Legal scholars such as Lawrence Lessig, Pamela Samuelson, Michael Froomkin, 
Yochai Benkler, Jessica Litman, Jonathan Weinberg, Julie Cohen, James Boyle and 
Ethan Katsh, to name only a few, created a new, cumulative literature on the relationship 
between digital/Internet technology and legal rights. Originally focused on privacy, the 
new school of thought cut its teeth on intellectual property battles (see Section 6.4 
below). This body of work, emanating from elite U.S. law schools, developed 
independently of the cultural and sociological critiques of the mass media and as such 
was largely untainted by Marxism or the “critical cultural theory” of the Frankfurt 
School. It was, rather, a form of liberal institutionalism. Its adherents shared a perception 
that the transition to a digitized technological environment required the redefinition of 
basic legal and institutional constructs, and that this change created both dangers and 
opportunities. In works like Code (1999) and The Future of Ideas (2001), Lessig in 
particular reached for an integrated analytical framework and ideology – something akin 
to the “environmentalism of the Net” heralded by James Boyle. The framework proved to 
be applicable to a broad variety of CIP issues, from copyright to telecommunications 
infrastructure regulation to radio spectrum management. The intellectual community of 
which Lessig can be considered the most prominent “star” was the 1990s counterpart to 
the law and economics school of the 1960s and 1970s (in fact, Lessig and Benkler both 
occasionally cite the work of Coase). Whereas the first provided the critique of regulation 
and the political-economy framework for telecommunications liberalization and 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, the new school addressed the relationship between 
information technology, law, and institutions in a way that gave some coherence to the 
efforts of the new generation of public interest advocates. 
 
Whatever the role of intellectual developments, digital info-communications provoked a 
flurry of major institutional changes in the mid-late 1990s: liberalization of cryptography; 
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act; the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996; a World Intellectual Property Organization treaty that proved to be the 
forerunner of the controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998; various efforts 
to censor or manage Internet content; the creation of ICANN. The changes are 
noteworthy for their increasingly transnational scope.  
 
Our data runs to the end of 2002, so we treat the early years of the new millennium as 
continuous with the 1990s.The chapter begins (Section 6.1) with an overview of the 
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organizational ecology during that period, documenting the major change in the 
composition of the population of public interest groups. Section 6.2 describes the 
privacy-oriented activism of the early 1990s, noting that it provided the crucible for the 
formation of a culture and political ethic for the online activism of the 1990s and beyond. 
Section 6.3 discusses public interest advocacy around the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 
including the reaction to the Communications Decency Act. Section 6.4 discusses 
advocacy and activism around intellectual property rights, showing how this issue 
provides the connective tissue tying together many of the public interest issues of the 
digital era. Section 6.5 looks at ICANN and the World Summit on the Information 
Society, indicators of the growing importance of transnational advocacy. Section 6.6 
examines the strengths and weaknesses of the recent activism and advocacy around 
media concentration and touches on some spectrum issues. A concluding Section 
discusses whether Internet and computers have produced new organizational forms of 
activism.  
 
6.1 The Organizational Ecology of the 1990s 
The 1990s produced a major change in the composition of the organizational population 
devoted to advocacy in CIP. This occurred at the same time as a massive increase in the 
number of congressional hearings on CIP issues. We can also detect a significant change 
in the pattern of participation in the hearings among the leading advocacy organizations. 
 
Table 6.1 (located at the end of this chapter) shows all the activist organizations that were 
founded and disbanded between the years 1990 and 2002, inclusive. Fifty-one (51) 
organizations formed during those years, and sixty-one (61) died. The 1990s saw the 
founding of the Association for Progressive Communications (1990), Electronic Frontiers 
Foundation (1990), Center for Media Education (1990), Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (1994), and Center for Democracy and Technology (1995), all of which survive to 
the present. Organizations founded in the 1990s that did not survive include the Voters 
Telecommunication Watch, Digital Future Coalition, and Internet Free Expression 
Alliance.  
 
With a large number of organizational deaths in 1992-3, 1996-97, and 2000-01, we see 
not only a decline in population density but also a pronounced shift in its composition. 
Mass media oriented organizations trying to influence content, especially those focused 
on pornography or an ethnic constituency, declined. Notable disbandments include 
Action for Children’s Television (1993), the venerable National Association for Better 
Broadcasting (1997), Tipper Gore’s Parents Music Resource Center (2000), and many 
other pro-decency and anti-pornography organizations. 
 
Content-mode advocacy declines from 50% of the organizational observations in the 
1980s to 44% in the 1990s. It declines even further, to 33%, during the first three years of 
the 2000s. Rights-based advocacy rises from 23% of the organizational observations in 
the 1980s to 29% in the 1990s; it then continues to grow in the 2000s until it matches 
content, with 33% of the observations. Organizations employing multiple modes of CIP 
advocacy rises to its largest level ever, 11%. The combination is usually economics and 
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rights. The digital era is thus characterized by a greater focus on rights-oriented advocacy 
and by a more integrated approach to advocacy. This assertion will be demonstrated in 
more concrete terms in the narrative below. 
 
Congressional activity, measured in terms of hearings, reached a frenetic peak in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. (Figure 6.1) For five consecutive years, the annual number of 
hearings related to CIP issues hovered around or over 100. Of all the social movement-
related topics, only environmental issues in the early 1990s can match this level of 
congressional activity. Reflecting the convergence of technologies, industries and media, 
multiple search terms were used by the Congressional Information Service to classify a 
growing number of the congressional hearings. In other words, a hearing that was 
classified as “computers and telecommunications” might also be classified as “Internet,” 
and/or “right of privacy.”  
 
Figure 6.1 
U.S. Congressional Hearings on CIP Topics, 1990 - 2002
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New rights-oriented groups such as EPIC, CDT, and EFF significantly altered the pattern 
of congressional testimony by U.S. advocacy groups. Prior to the 1990s, the ACLU 
dominated public interest group testimony on CIP issues. No other public interest 
organization came close to its share of testimony slots. Suddenly, in the 1990s, the 
ACLU’s percentage drops to 6%, and four other organizations (CDT, EPIC, and 
consumer organizations) have parity with it. This does not mean that ACLU testified less 
frequently or was less effective as an organization. Rather, the overall quantity of 
testimony on CIP issues increased so much that there was room for several other 
organizations, and instead of one dominant organization we have a group with roughly 
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equal shares. In particular, CDT and EPIC emerge alongside ACLU as leading rights-
oriented organizations in terms of Congressional testimony.53 Also, both the Consumers 
Union and the Consumers Federation of America rise to the top five of public interest 
groups testifying on CIP issues, whereas before they accounted for a smaller (but 
noticeable) percentage of CIP testimony by public interest organizations. The new 
prominence of consumer organizations indicates the increasing importance of CIP issues 
to the general public, the growing prominence of economic issues and modes of advocacy 
in CIP, and the decision by consumer organizations to invest resources in policy areas 
where the industry was divided and they could play balance of power politics.  
 
Table 6.2  Specific Organizations’ Percentage of Total CIP-related Congressional 
Testimony by Public Interest Organizations, by Decade. 
 
1980s 
Organization 
% of p.i. 
testimony 
American Civil Liberties Union 14.70% 
Consumer Federation of America 5.78% 
Public Citizen 4.34% 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 2.89% 
Media Access Project 2.41% 
American Association of Retired Persons 2.41% 
Common Cause 2.17% 
National Black Media Coalition 1.93% 
Action for Children's Television 1.93% 
United Church of Christ 1.69% 
Organization for Use of the Telephone 1.69% 
Telecommunications Research and Action Center 1.69% 
Consumers Union 1.45% 
 
1990s 
Organization 
% of p.i.  
testimony 
American Civil Liberties Union 6.33% 
Center for Democracy and Technology 5.84% 
Consumers Union 5.60% 
Consumer Federation of America 5.11% 
National Consumers League 4.14% 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 2.68% 
Electronic Privacy Information Center 2.68% 
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility 2.43% 
Citizens for a Sound Economy 2.43% 
American Association of Retired Persons 2.19% 
Media Access Project 1.95% 
 
2000s 
Organization 
% of p.i. 
testimony 
Center for Democracy and Technology 11.84% 
Consumers Union 9.87% 
American Civil Liberties Union 7.24% 
                                                 
53
 It is worth noting that CDT’s Director Jerry Berman was affiliated with the ACLU prior to moving first 
to EFF and then to CDT. CDT’s politics, which are more centrist and emphasize closer ties to business 
groups, might be related to its lead in the overall percentage of testimony slots in the 2000s.  
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Electronic Privacy Information Center 7.24% 
U.S. Public Interest Research Group 3.95% 
Americans for Tax Reform 3.29% 
National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children 2.63% 
Citizens for a Sound Economy 1.97% 
Progress & Freedom Foundation 1.97% 
National Law Center for Children and Families 1.97% 
Consumer Federation of America 1.32% 
American Association of Retired Persons 1.32% 
Public Citizen 1.32% 
Common Cause 1.32% 
 
 
6.2 The Crucible: Privacy and Crypto 
Privacy issues have always provided an important, long-term area of overlap between Net 
activists and the traditional civil liberties and civil rights movements. During the late 
1960s and 1970s, civil liberties, civil rights, and peace organizations, angered and 
frightened by governmental abuses of spying powers, came to oppose electronic 
surveillance and data collection by the growing national security state.54 The early Net 
activists, on the other hand, came into conflict with the security apparatus of the state not 
as antiwar or civil rights activists, but as technologists who were cracking open a long-
term governmental monopoly on advanced encryption techniques. 
 
The encryption issue was more than just a question of de-controlling a powerful 
technology. It evolved into a radical assessment of the problem of identity in cyberspace, 
and the relationship between the individual and the state online. Encryption, coupled with 
David Chaum’s invention of blind digital signatures and non-traceable anonymous cash, 
was thought to possess “the potential to make cyberspace into an identity-free zone.” 
(Levy, 2001, 223)  This potential formed the basis for a movement variously known as 
“cryptoanarchy,” “cryptoactivism,” or “cypherpunks.”55 The origins of that movement 
are usually traced to a September 1992 invitation-only meeting called by Eric Hughes, 
Tim May and John Gilmore in Berkeley, California. The gathering, in a playful swipe at 
CPSR, was dubbed “Cryptology Amateurs for Social Irresponsibility” (Levy, 2001) 
 
The formation of EFF followed a similar pattern of confrontation with the state. John 
Perry Barlow, a lyricist for the Grateful Dead and regular participant in discussions on 
the WELL (Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link, one of the earliest online communities based in 
San Francisco), became concerned about the efforts of law enforcement agencies to crack 
down on computer crime. Barlow had links to the hacker community, which led the FBI 
to question him about the theft of proprietary software by a hacker group. Barlow was 
                                                 
54
 To the activists focused on broadcasting, of course, privacy was perceived as a separate, largely unrelated 
issue and those organizations do not appear in Congressional testimony regarding privacy rights in the 
1970s. 
55
 For the “manifesto” of the crypto anarchists, see http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-
anarchy.html. May’s manifesto dates back to 1988. A more developed sense of the relationship between 
technology and privacy rights can be found in Eric Hughes’ Cypherpunk Manifesto  
http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html. 
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amazed and frightened by the FBI’s ignorance of computer technology and its consequent 
inability to distinguish pranks from truly threatening criminal activity.56 This led to the 
formation of EFF. EFF began its life as an activist group by making a grant to CPSR’s 
“Computing and Civil Liberties Project,” run by Marc Rotenberg.57  It then began to 
build up its own litigation and lobbying staff, including Jerry Berman, formerly of the 
ACLU.  
6.2.1 The Lotus Marketplace Episode 
An early test of net activism’s political potential came in the spring of 1990, and the 
galvanizing issue involved privacy. The Lotus Corporation had just announced a database 
product called Marketplace, a CD-ROM that contained information about 120 million 
American households. A community described as “computer specialists, academics, and 
privacy experts” by Gurak (1997, 27) mounted a campaign against the product. Called 
the “first online action” by Gurak, the campaign saw Usenet newsgroups and email 
listservs debate the privacy implications of the product and organize online petitions and 
email campaigns. Involved were Marc Rotenberg, then associated with CPSR, Mitch 
Kapor, the ACLU, and the Privacy Times, indicating that the “privacy community” was 
already fairly well defined by November 1990. Although the target was small and its 
outcome was isolated rather than institutional, the campaign against Lotus Marketplace 
was successful: the company withdrew the product in January 1991 due to the protests. 
 
Compared to many routine activities today the privacy implications of Marketplace seem 
tame. Gurak’s analysis of the episode highlights some of the rhetorical excesses of the 
anti-Marketplace action and implicitly suggests that the Marketplace product was pursued 
more as a potent symbolic object of concerns about privacy than as a major threat to it 
per se. Of course, all social movements work in this way, seizing opportunistically on 
flashpoints that will motivate their base and attempting (hopefully) to steer that social 
energy into the right channels. 
6.2.2 The Crypto War  
A far more significant battle ensued in 1993, pitting net activists against the U.S. 
Government’s national security and law enforcement apparatus. The Computer Security 
Act of 1987 had authorized NIST, a civilian agency, to develop a new standard for 
computer encryption. NIST, however, proved to be pliant to the demands of the National 
Security Administration and developed an encryption standard with a backdoor for 
government surveillance. The standard, known as the Escrowed Encryption Standard and 
more popularly as “the Clipper chip,” was released by President Clinton on April 16, 
1993. Clipper posed one of the most fundamental of policy issues: the contradictions 
between the individual’s right to secure, private communication and the state’s desire to 
protect national security and enhance law enforcement by maintaining a systematic 
surveillance capability. Clipper provided a way for the U.S. government to break the 
encryption of any message. In order to make this possible the government had to insert 
                                                 
56
 Barlow’s own account of EFF’s formation can be found here: http://www.eff.org/Misc/EFF/history.eff  
57
 CPSR’s Computing and Civil Liberties project began in 1985 after President Reagan, at the behest of the 
National Security Administration, attempted to restrict access to government computer systems through the 
creation of a new classification authority. 
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itself into the center of the encryption process as the escrow holder of private keys 
capable of unlocking any encrypted communication. The government had ceased 
attempting to suppress encryption technology outright, but was now insisting on holding 
on to rights to access encrypted communications. 
 
The “clipper chip” program galvanized nearly all elements of the technical community, 
moderate and radical. Clipper was debated on Usenet newsgroups, via email, email 
discussion lists, and FTP sites. CPSR criticized NSA’s role in the development of the 
standard, noting that it had “largely ignored” a public advisory group. The anti-Clipper 
activists relied heavily on the Freedom of Information Act to make this case. EFF 
fostered public commentary, as 225 of 298 comments received by NIST and published in 
the Federal register were forwarded to it by EFF from emails received by the advocacy 
organization. Equally important, the crypto activists were able to enter into a powerful 
alliance with business software users and producers, who saw the controls as an obstacle 
to commerce. Clipper had negative implications for foreign trade as well as civil liberties, 
for if the U.S. government imposed a backdoor to all digital equipment manufactured in 
the U.S., what foreign citizens and companies would purchase U.S. products? The Digital 
Privacy and Security Working Group, a coalition of communication and computer 
companies and consumer and privacy advocates, was formed in May 1993, less than a 
month after Clipper announced. 
 
A large number of established net activists have some link to the anti-Clipper movement. 
For example, the annual Computers, Freedom and Privacy conferences were initiated as a 
forum for the discussion and debate of the crypto issue. The Clipper standard was 
ultimately withdrawn, and cryptography was opened to commercial and public use. 
Giving some idea of the size of the mobilized community, in 2000 RSA’s annual crypto 
conference attracted over 10,000 people to celebrate the victory of crypto deregulation. 
6.2.3. EFF, Computer Crime, CALEA 
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), commonly known 
as the “Digital Telephony bill,” was a battle between the FBI and the privacy community 
roughly contemporaneous with the Clipper-chip episode. It was an attempt by the FBI to 
require telecommunication companies to modify their equipment to make digital 
communications easier to wiretap. It was proposed under the Clinton administration 
based on recommendations made during the first Bush administration. The opposition to 
this bill reproduced, but in a weaker form, the industry-civil liberties coalition that was 
successful in opposing Clipper. CALEA was enacted in 1994, however, and its 
interpretation and implementation since have diminished privacy rights seriously. 
CALEA led to a famous split between EFF’s inside-Washington and outside-Washington 
participants.58 EFF’s grass roots felt that their opposition to CALEA had been 
undermined by an insider deal made by the Washington staff. EFF fired its DC-based 
executive director and moved its headquarters to San Francisco, while the Washington-
based camp, led by Jerry Berman, became the core of Center for Democracy and 
Technology. Tensions between these two camps persist to this day. 
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 See http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/199412/msg00053.html  
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6.3. The 1996 Telecommunications Act and CDA 
When the Clinton administration arrived in January 1993 it began to promote the concept 
of a “National Information Infrastructure” or “information superhighway.” Around the 
same time, lobbying by the remnants of the Bell system to modify the terms of the AT&T 
divestiture agreement compelled action on a sweeping revision of the 1934 
Communications Act. The conjunction of major legislative reform and a Democratic 
Presidency focused on communications infrastructure issues created a signal political 
opportunity.  
 
The DC-based communication-information activist groups responded to this opportunity 
adroitly. Led by the Center for Media Education, the Association for Research Libraries 
and the Washington Office of CPSR, they formed an informal association known as the 
Telecommunications Policy Roundtable (TPR). The opportunity presented was different 
from that created by the WLBT lawsuits nearly three decades earlier. The citizen-based 
petition to deny had given media activists a direct form of leverage over broadcaster 
conduct. In the early 1990s, in contrast, the influence of the advocacy groups came from 
formulating principles and setting policy agendas, and hoping that legislators would carry 
their ideas into the new law.  
 
The TPR eventually combined 40 public interest groups around a set of “public interest 
principles.”59 According to Drake (1997, 180) the following agenda was successfully 
inserted into the legislative process: 
 
 Open Platform service (switched, end-to-end digital telecom service regulated as 
common carrier 
 
 Universal service. Promote access to advanced services, schools and libraries 
added to list of subsidized services.  
 
 Preferential “advanced services” rates for government agencies, non-profit 
educational institutions, health care, public libraries, public museums, public 
broadcasters, and charitable organizations.  
 
 Restrictions on the RBOCs’ ability to participate in information services and 
electronic publishing markets and their ability to buy or operate traditional cable 
systems within their telephone service area; requirements to offer unbundled 
access to information service providers.  
 
 FCC was required to examine costs and benefits of requiring open interface 
standards for cable TV set top boxes, and to promote ownership diversity. 
 
 FCC and NTIA were to study policies promoting civic participation in the NII.  
                                                 
59
 “Renewing the Commitment to a Public Interest Telecommunications Policy,” Telecommunications 
Policy Roundtable, September 1, 1993.  
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 Resource reservations were to be built into the infrastructure; e.g., there should be 
a 5% capacity set aside for “public spaces” in telecom networks. (Originally, the 
groups had called for a 20% set aside.) 
 
Drake believes that while the public interest groups got significant concepts and language 
into the initial drafts, all changed after the November 1994 election, which gave 
Republicans control of the House and Senate. The final statute was a “bipartisan 
compromise on liberalization with a few pro-competitive and consumer safeguards added 
in.” (1997, 191)  While the power shift in Congress pushed back on the advocates’ 
agenda, they did have significant impact on the final outcome. In particular, the 1996 Act 
contained expansive new universal service requirements to fund networking in schools 
and libraries.  
 
The TPR and participation in the 1996 Telecom Act began the process of reorienting DC-
based activist groups away from the traditional focus on mass media content and toward 
infrastructure regulation issues. The TPR as a coalition included both traditional media 
activist groups and the newer Internet- and privacy-oriented public interest groups, such 
as the Electronic Frontiers Foundation (although the inclusion of EFF did not take place 
without some friction).60 The groups involved in the TPR used Internet listservs and 
Usenet groups to disseminate their ideas and mobilize their supporters. Yet, once again, 
they had little impact on the overall economic structure of the telecommunications 
industry. 
 
The 1996 Act when passed contained the ill-fated Communications Decency Act and the 
V-chip requirement.61 In general, the proliferation of information sources on the Internet 
led to domestic and international conflicts over censorship and content regulation. This 
seemingly traditional communications policy issue, however, took on a radical, 
institution-bending cast because of the Internet’s non-territorial and individualized 
architecture of distribution. In the public discourse on CDA, opponents of the law made a 
point of differentiating Internet communications from broadcasting. To control Internet 
content would have required new institutional mechanisms (e.g., accurate age 
identification on a global basis, and exposing publishers in one jurisdiction to the laws of 
a remote jurisdiction) with more far-reaching effects than magazine or film censorship.  
 
The CDA’s passage as part of the 1996 Telecommunications Act galvanized the Net 
activist community like no other issue has before or since. Small enough to be readily 
mobilized and large enough to make its presence felt, the online population 
spontaneously generated a major campaign. EFF formed a widely followed Blue Ribbon 
Campaign wherein managers of web sites would post a blue ribbon graphic indicating 
their support for free speech. Voters Telecommunications Watch mobilized voters and 
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 The initial announcement of the Roundtable (posted to the com-priv newsgroup) suggested “that EFF's 
work on infrastructure policy issues over the last year was narrow and lacking in vision.” Email from 
Daniel Weitzner, EFF, to Dave Farber’s “Interesting People” listserv, July 22, 1993. EFF joined the TPR in 
late July 1993.  
61
 The V-chip was opposed by ACLU but not by the other activist groups. 
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ran a campaign to “Turn the Web Black.” The law’s constitutionality was challenged by 
two parties, the ACLU and a coalition of nearly 40 organizations organized as the 
Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition (CIEC). The CIEC coalition included the 
American Library Association, America Online, and Microsoft as well as public interest 
groups.  
 
When the law was ruled unconstitutional, its disappointed supporters appealed to gender 
and class divisions. “We know the online community overwhelmingly opposed the CDA, 
but only 10 percent of the country is online and they're mostly male and mostly upper-
class,” said Cathleen Cleaver, director of legal studies for the Family Research Council. 
“They've had complete freedom online and they just don't want to burden themselves by 
changing their ways to protect children.”62 
6.4 Intellectual Property Rights 
Cyber-rights truly came of age as a political tendency when it was forced to confront the 
ultimate institutional problem: the definition of property rights to digital resources. 
Debates over ownership of personal information are implicit in the computer privacy 
debate; data about oneself becomes alienable and can be collected, stored and processed 
by third parties, leading to questions about who “owns” it and the terms and conditions of 
its usage. But the most dramatic rights conflicts occurred (and are occurring) in relation 
to intellectual property rights (IPR). This includes not only the highly publicized battles 
over online sharing of copyrighted entertainment content, but also the movement against 
software patents, the open source movement, and the battles over trademarks and Internet 
domain names.  
 
As Internet activities undermined the exclusivity of copyrighted music, images and text, 
the intellectual property community mobilized and sought stronger, globalized IPR 
protection mechanisms. A great deal of Net activism in the late 1990s defines itself in 
opposition to the policy agenda of the frightened yet militant and politically powerful IPR 
interests. This conflict cuts across a wide variety of CIP issues. Efforts to strengthen 
digital IPR often lead to proposals to heavily regulate various aspects of the 
communications-information infrastructure and to incursions on personal privacy. 
Moreover, the IPR battle turns the politics of the 1980s and early 1990s on its head, with 
many business interests allying with governmental law enforcement interests and 
abandoning ideas of “deregulation” and seeking more governmental controls over 
infrastructure, equipment and conduct.  
 
Early in this struggle, for example, major copyright holders attempted to argue that the 
digital copies made routinely in the transmission of data over the Internet constituted 
infringements. (Casey, 2000)  The Digital Future Coalition brought together public 
interest groups with Internet Service Providers concerned about the paralysis of basic 
Internet functions that would occur if strong, literalistic notions of copyright protection 
were applied to it. By taking its agenda to Geneva and seeking a global treaty, the U.S. 
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 Art Kramer, Cox News Service, “Coalition Cheers Court Victory over Decency Act,” June 18, 1996. 
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government internationalized the struggle to define new property rights for the digital 
environment. (Samuelson, 1997)  
 
IPR emerged as central because in digital systems intellectual property, freedom of 
expression and privacy are closely related. Content producers want to be rewarded for 
their efforts and thus have an incentive to track uses and users. They also have an 
incentive to erect technological barriers that give them the ability to exclude non-paying 
users. While private barriers to cultural appropriation and fair use can be legitimate, when 
joined to the power of the state they can become oppressive and self-defeatingly 
restrictive – the classic example being the Motion Picture Association of America’s 
attempt to ban the video cassette recorder in the mid-1980s. When IPR protections are 
extended too far, they can not only limit free expression, but also undermine privacy by 
building up an enforcement and surveillance apparatus that can be abused. They are at 
their worst when they are combined with governmental standard-setting and regulatory 
powers to become “hardwired” into the design of consumer devices and public 
infrastructure.  
 
The linkage of governmental regulatory powers to IPR-related surveillance and 
enforcement is becoming increasingly common. One current example is ICANN’s 
domain name registration regulations, which require registries to reserve names for 
trademark holders, subject registrants to privacy-eroding rules about disclosure of contact 
data, and require registrants to subject themselves to a dispute resolution system biased 
toward trademark owners (for a discussion of activism and advocacy around those issues, 
see Section 6.5 below). Another example is the “broadcast flag” standards under 
development at the FCC, which seek to require digital broadcast receivers to contain 
tracking devices for detection and enforcement of content rights.  
 
At its most sophisticated, IPR resistance constitutes a recognition that the definition of 
property rights has distributional consequences, and the activists strive to ensure that the 
institutionalization of digital property rights cultivates a robust public domain, respects 
and enhances the rights of end users, individuals, and consumers, and does not constitute 
regulation designed to unjustly transfer wealth to major corporate holders of IPR (e.g., by 
indefinite extensions of copyright terms). In its less sophisticated and ultimately less 
viable manifestations, IPR resistance constitutes a rejection of information property per 
se – a kind of “info-communism” that caricatures and recapitulates the failed 
communisms of the 20th century. Both tendencies are present in the underlying social 
movement activity.  
 
Leading advocacy organizations around intellectual property include EFF, which has 
defended individuals prosecuted for violating some of the anti-circumvention provisions 
of the DMCA and resisted the Recording Industry Association of America’s attempts to 
prosecute individual users for downloading music files. Public Knowledge has tried to 
mobilize opposition to the Federal Communications Commission’s “broadcast flag” 
standards. Lessig joined with Eric Eldred, a noncommercial Internet publisher of public 
domain texts and derivative works, and others, to mount an unsuccessful Supreme Court 
challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act. Consumer Project on Technology has 
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played a major role in the international arena, working to moderate the application of 
drug patents and participating in negotiations at WIPO on the status of IPR protection for 
webcasting.63  
 
A related issue concerns proprietary rights over software. This includes both software 
patent resistance and the “open-source” issue. These are distinct policy issues but both 
engage around the concept of information property rights and draw upon the software 
developer/Internet culture’s support for open standards and information sharing. Open 
source can be considered a type of social movement among information technology 
professionals and computer programmers. Like environmentalism, it began as an 
aesthetic and ethical stance but succeeded in making a strong practical case as well. 
(Wheeler, 2003)  The GNU/Linux operating system has begun to be taken seriously by 
major industry actors; e.g., IBM and Hewlett-Packard announced sales of Linux 
computers to federal agencies in 2002. Like the environmental movement, open source 
activism combines those who are motivated by cultural and ideological stances as well as 
those who see open source alternatives as a pragmatic way of getting better software and 
minimizing the depredations of a Microsoft’s dominance. The incursions of open source 
software into the consumer market are small and are likely to remain so, but in larger-
scale educational, business and government information systems it has had an appreciable 
impact. 
 
Some of the legal scholars mentioned earlier have developed critiques of software patents 
(e.g., Marc Lemley and Julie Cohen). The League for Programming Freedom, Richard 
Stallman, EFF founder Mitch Kapor and others in the free software community have 
opposed patents since the early 1990s at least.  
 
Microsoft is to the information economy of the 2000’s what the Bell System was to the 
information economy of the 1970’s and 80’s. It dominates a strategically critical industry, 
giving itself the power to set de facto standards and influence vertically related industries. 
Resistance to Microsoft’s dominance of the software industry has involved using both 
traditional antitrust and regulatory tools and the slow but steady cultivation of open 
source alternatives. In the antitrust battles, public interest groups have played a less than 
central role, taking sides in industry conflicts (as was the case during the AT&T breakup 
and the restructuring of the telecommunications industry). The basic policy alternatives 
have been defined primarily by inter-and intra-industry economic conflicts of interest, 
and both sides (Microsoft as well as its opponents) occasionally enlist economists and 
public interest groups to weigh in.  
 
6.5 ICANN and WSIS 
The Internet’s non-territorial architecture has heightened the importance of international 
institutions, at a time when global liberalization of the telecommunications industry was 
already making communications and information industries and policies more integrated 
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and interdependent. Two developments at the turn of the century signal the growing 
importance of transnational advocacy and activism in the CIP domain.  
6.5.1 ICANN and global democracy 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was incorporated 
in 1998. Ostensibly a private corporation, it was invoked by a U.S. Department of 
Commerce White Paper as part of an attempt to “privatize” the administration of the 
Internet’s name and address infrastructure, which had been operated by U.S. government 
contractors. ICANN as an institution deals with the core issues of the digital economy: 
intellectual property and free expression, in the form of domain name – trademark 
disputes; privacy, in the form of its WHOIS database that links Internet identities to 
personal information about domain name registrants; and competition policy, in its 
regulation of registry and registrar businesses.  
 
In some respects, ICANN’s roots are in “civil society.” The Internet Society, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, education and research networking organizations, and the 
informal series of meetings known as the International Forum on the White Paper 
(IFWP), all of which played major roles in ICANN’s background or creation, were civil 
society organizations and/or largely composed of such organizations. By relying on 
private sector governance and adding some democratic and representative accountability 
mechanisms, ICANN had the potential to constitute a revolutionary innovation in 
international organization. Its organizational form constituted a threat both to the 
hegemony of nation-states and their international intergovernmental organizations. That 
potential, however, was systematically undermined and eventually destroyed by the 
management clique that seized control of the organization at its inception. (See Mueller, 
2002) 
 
ICANN’s original organizational structure provided two formal channels for participation 
by individuals, civil society interests and advocacy groups: 
• The Noncommercial Users Constituency (NCUC) 
• The At-large membership 
 
The Noncommercial Constituency (NCUC) is one of six constituencies that make up 
ICANN’s Generic Names Supporting Organization. Along with the other constituencies, 
it participates in the nomination and election of 3 ICANN Board members and develops 
policies about domain names. It was originally formed by a tense combination of the 
Internet Society and the Association for Computing Machinery’s Internet Governance 
Project and the Syracuse University Convergence Center. CDT, ACLU, the Markle 
Foundation, EPIC, Media Access Project, Asian NGOs such as Glocom and Networkers 
Against Surveillance (Japan), Peacenet and Jinbonet (Korea), various UNDP Sustainable 
Development Networking Program national chapters, all are or have been involved at one 
point or another.  
 
Under the original plan for ICANN the At-large membership was empowered to elect 9 
(just under half) of the Board members. Individuals would have the right to become 
members of ICANN and acquired voting rights in these elections. Just as the legal 
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precedent giving citizens “standing” in broadcast license renewal challenges created a 
political opportunity that mobilized public interest groups, so ICANN’s commitment to a 
democratic membership and representation led to widespread participation in ICANN in 
its early days. In the first, experimental at-large election, the  two most powerful Internet 
regions – North America and Europe, which accounted for about 75 percent of the 
world’s internet infrastructure – elected board members who were critical of ICANN’s 
management. Indeed, the North American electee, Karl Auerbach, a technical veteran, 
was perhaps the most prominent and persistent critic of ICANN in the United States. (See 
NAIS, 2001, 156, for an account of the elections and a case for continued elections)  
 
In February 2002, ICANN’s CEO, Stuart Lynn, argued that its governance model was 
“not working” and called for sweeping “reforms.” The reforms eventually passed 
represented a reversion to an insulated and self-selecting board. It completely eliminated 
its prior commitment to a membership and relied instead on a Nominating Committee 
selected by the Board and the councils of the SOs. The At-large was demoted to an 
Advisory Committee that appoints several people to the Nominating Committee and 
holds nonvoting positions on various Councils and tasks forces. It is administered by a 
full-time, paid staff person whose loyalties are to ICANN management rather than to 
public representation. 
 
By firmly closing what had been a relatively open channel for public participation in an 
international organization, ICANN’s “Evolution and Reform” process led to some 
demobilization of public interest groups within ICANN. However, a newly revivified 
Noncommercial Constituency is still available as an autonomous channel for civil society 
participation, and on the GNSO Council frequently holds the swing votes on various 
policy matters due to conflicts of interest among the business user constituencies and the 
domain name supply industry constituencies. Moreover, the decision by WSIS to create a 
UN Working Group on Internet governance (see below) has sparked renewed interest in 
civil society participation in ICANN.  
6.5.2 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
The WSIS is a UN summit administered by the International Telecommunication Union. 
It consists of a series of meetings designed to produce a Draft Declaration of Principles 
and a Draft Plan of Action. The official goal of WSIS – to develop and implement a 
“worldwide vision for the information society” some 20 years after the information 
society has developed, under the auspices of an international organization that has no 
policy making authority and controls no significant taxing authority, technology or 
capital – may sound comical to those with a sense of how the global information 
economy works. However, WSIS is intensely interesting because of the civil society 
outreach aspect. As part of the ITU’s and UN’s attempt to make themselves more 
relevant, WSIS drew a significant number of civil society activists focused on CIP into its 
processes. Many civil society participants were disappointed with the results of Phase 1 
of the Summit, which inevitably reflected the views of governments much more than 
their own. Nevertheless, WSIS offered a unique opportunity to assemble transnational 
advocacy groups involved in information and communication policy from around the 
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world, where they can become acquainted, develop working relationships, and perhaps 
come closer to an agreed-on set of principles or policies.  
 
More interesting yet, the international legitimacy controversies swirling around ICANN 
provoked the Summit into authorizing the UN Secretary-General to create a working 
group on Internet governance. The UN Working Group creates a new arena for 
transnational advocacy, and provides a forum for airing fundamental issues about global 
governance related to CIP.  
 
6.6 Media Concentration  
A widespread campaign against media concentration by citizens groups and industry 
interests in 2003 succeeded in blocking changes in FCC ownership rules proposed by the 
FCC Chair.  
 
Late in 2002 the Federal Communications Commission undertook a comprehensive 
review of its broadcast ownership rules. Ownership limits applied to broadcasting stations 
had been progressively liberalized since the 1980s, but took their most dramatic steps in 
1991, and in 1996 with the passage of the new Telecommunications Act. The primary 
purpose of the 2002 proceeding was to respond to court decisions that the ownership 
limits already in place were arbitrary and had not been justified by the record. The FCC 
proposed new rules in 2003 that took incremental steps toward further relaxation of the 
broadcast ownership limits, allowing more stations to be owned by the same company 
and more cross ownership between broadcasting and other media, subject to the 
calculations of a “diversity index.” 
 
A good summary of public opposition to the FCC proposal can be found in The Media 
Policy Action Directory.64 The opposition was greatly strengthened by the role of local 
activists and the ability of the movement to move beyond DC-based advocacy. 
Democratic FCC Commissioners who opposed the rule changes (Copps and Adelstein) 
got the FCC to hold regional public hearings on media concentration. The hearings 
created a political opportunity for public mobilization which was seized upon by local 
groups such as Media Tank and Prometheus Radio in Philadelphia, Media Alliance in 
San Francisco and CMA in Seattle. Hearings were held in New York, Seattle, Austin, 
Durham, Phoenix, Chicago, Burlington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Marin 
County, Detroit and Atlanta. The events attracted around 600 people in San Francisco, 
300 in Seattle, 600 in Atlanta. There were large crowds in most of the other locales, 
sometimes standing room only, with people standing outside for hours waiting to get in 
or participate. 
 
National advocacy groups also played a role. Media Access Project, which had been 
researching, agitating, and developing policy proposals around media ownership since the 
1970s, joined with Prometheus Radio in a legal challenge to the ruling. The Center for 
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Digital Democracy distributed funds received from a foundation to local organizations at 
the site of the hearings.65 Support for the anti-FCC campaign also included conservative 
groups such as the National Rifle Association and Parents Television Council. In the end, 
the FCC received tens of thousands of letters opposing the rule changes and the advocates 
succeeded, via demonstrations, petitions, and vocal participation in the hearings, in 
pushing the issue into the public agenda for a sustained period of time. Although the FCC 
voted to adopt the rule changes in June 2003, the campaign against them was so effective 
that the Congress quickly and overwhelmingly voted to block them. 
 
The coalition assembled by the anti-media concentration forces in many ways reproduces 
the one that succeeded in briefly re-regulating cable television in the early 1990s. It 
combines liberal consumer groups and media activists with strategically placed industry 
groups (advertisers, content producers and some smaller broadcasters) that have strong 
economic interests in continued media ownership limits. It was also able to draw on 
conservative groups’ dissatisfaction with the media. 
 
The key weakness of the media concentration opponents is that they have not articulated 
an alternative economic structure or set of regulations, institutions and policies capable of 
addressing what they see as the problem. The campaign was waged largely as a defense 
of existing ownership restrictions. For many grass-roots activists, opposition to the 
ownership changes was rooted in an anti-capitalist critique of “big corporations” that 
provided little substantive policy guidance. As of now, there is no theoretical bridge 
linking concepts of “diversity” or opposition to media consolidation to specific legal and 
regulatory prescriptions shaping industry structure. Opponents of further concentration, 
for example, have difficulty explaining why 45% of the national market is “too much” 
and 35% is acceptable. In the absence of theoretically-grounded ideas and specific 
proposals for institutional change, further relaxation of broadcast ownership limits (and 
the further integration of broadcasting businesses into the wider digital media 
marketplace) is likely to continue as public mobilization, always ephemeral and difficult 
to sustain, dies down. 
 
Moreover, despite the temporary alliance of convenience, the right wingers who sent 
letters to the FCC asking it to oppose “big media” because they think it has a liberal bias 
are hardly compatible with the long term agenda of liberal groups, who believe that big 
media are harbingers of corporate capitalism. Indeed, one negative side effect of the 
media concentration battle has been a new “decency” campaign by regulators that has 
cast a chill on broadcast expression. In 2003-4, the FCC received 350,000 complaints 
about “indecency” in programming, hundreds of times more than its norm. Michael 
Copps, the FCC Commissioner who led the charge against the proposed ownership rules, 
has explicitly linked his support for stringent “decency” regulation to the anti-
concentration campaign, noting that competition for ratings is what drives the trend 
toward edgy content.  
 
                                                 
65
 B. Butler, S. Matani, L. Nutter, G. Spilka, C. Borgman-Arboleda, A. Dichter. “Strengths, Challenges, and 
Collaboration: Advocacy groups organizing together on media ownership and beyond.” Report and 
Reflections from the Fall, 2003 Media Diversity Convening, Philadelphia, PA. February 18, 2004.  
 81
Another recent policy issue, unlicensed spectrum, is too current to cover adequately in 
this report, but needs to be connected to the narrative because of its importance. Policy 
developments around radio spectrum have failed to attract the same level of public 
interest and engagement but have, paradoxically, had more positive results. The 
difference, we think, is that in spectrum policy advocates have had something concrete to 
advocate. Armed with notions of an unlicensed spectrum “commons,”66 and specific 
technical and legal concepts of how to create such a commons (e.g., Werbach, 2004), 
advocates have in the past two years pushed for opening up more spectrum for unlicensed 
public use, and for re-allocations of spectrum away from the control of traditional 
broadcasters (where much of it lies fallow).  
 
6.7 Postscript on New Organizational Forms 
At the convening held to discuss the first draft of this report, some participants objected 
to the report’s initial conclusion that “net activism has not yet developed its own 
distinctive organizational form for political activism.” Their objections, however, may 
have been based on a misunderstanding of what was being asserted. The email listservs 
and slashdot-style interactive web sites are most definitely new forms of communication 
and community-building. And there is no doubt that online activists are using the tools of 
the Internet with skill and creativity. But we still do not see a new kind of 
institutionalized interface with the political, governmental, or legal structures that would 
give these tools traction in creating institutional change. Or to put it more precisely, the 
political structure has not adjusted to online interaction in a way that creates new political 
opportunities. There are no structural changes analogous to those that gave rise to the 
public interest organization in the 1960s and ‘70s. What we see now are hybrids of new 
technology and old organizational forms. Web sites and the Internet are used to raise 
money to support traditional electoral campaigns, for example; or traditional public 
interest groups use the Internet to generate activity and mobilize their membership. But 
we do not see a new form interaction between citizen groups and their government. The 
ability to testify and lobby in person in Washington is still far more important than 
anything that happens online, and the online activity must still be converted into 
traditional modes of activity. Of course, to say that existing public interest organizations 
organized around digital issues do not yet constitute a new organizational form does not 
detract from their importance and value at all. It is simply to state a sociological and 
political fact. 
 
In order to qualify as a new organizational form, the political structure would have to 
change itself in ways that open new channels of influence for virtual communities and 
online activists. Those new channels would have to alter the status of online 
communication and communicators vis-à-vis the political system; giving them, for 
example, a status comparable to DC-based lobbyists or voters. But in many ways, we see 
the opposite occurring. For a brief period politicians opened themselves up to email from 
their constituents. As a result, they were inundated with an unmanageable torrent of 
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messages. They have responded by closing that channel or radically discounting it.67 This 
does not mean that the Internet and online activism won’t eventually produce institutional 
changes comparable to the structural changes of the 1960s; it simply means that those 
changes haven’t occurred yet. We do not know what form they will take when they do 
occur. Indeed, the lack of wholesale institutional adjustment at this point is not surprising. 
Digital communications and the Internet really are radical technologies, and radical 
changes don’t happen easily. Computer communications can generate so much 
information and so much communicative activity that traditional political institutions will 
take a long time to adjust to them. To incorporate the full potential of online activism 
would require structural changes in political organization, changes that would threaten 
existing political equilibria. Even liberal groups, for example, are leery of attempts to 
computerize voting machines. The idea of “e-government,” at the current time, is just a 
pallid concept that refers to the implementation of information systems by governmental 
agencies to increase the speed and efficiency of their existing processes. Full integration 
of Internet and telecommunication into the governance structure will mean much more 
than that; it will change the processes to take full advantage of online capabilities. 
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   Table 6.1  Advocacy Groups Formed, 1990-2002 
 
Foundings Deaths 
1990-91 
Anti-Censorship and Deception Union First Amendment Research Institute 
Association for Progressive Communications Concerned Citizens for Universal Service 
Center for the Study of Commercialism  
Electronic Frontier Foundation  
National Anxiety Center  
National Campaign for Freedom of Expression  
Rock the Vote  
American Satellite Television Alliance  
Center for Media Education  
Computer Users for Social Responsibility  
National Association to Protect Individual Rights  
1992-93 
Center for Civic Networking Council for Children's Television and Media 
Gap Media Project Action for Children's Television 
United States Privacy Council Crusade for Decency 
People Against Telephone Terrorism and Harassment Women Against Violence Against Women 
Progress and Freedom Foundation Media Action Coalition 
 Telecommunications Consumer Coalition 
 World Institute of Black Communications 
 Public Interest Video Network 
 Women's Media Project 
 Media Forum 
 Citizen's Against Pornography 
1994-95 
Electronic Privacy Information Center Alliance to End Repression 
Voters Telecomm Watch Scholars and Citizens for Freedom of Information 
Center for Democracy and Technology First Amendment Press 
Consumer Project on Technology Fairness in Media 
Families Against Internet Censorship Committee on Israeli Censorship 
Feminists for Free Expression  
Mainstream Media Project  
National Public Radio Election Project  
Privacy Global Resource Center  
VTW Center for Internet Education  
About Face  
Digital Future Coalition  
CryptoRights Foundation  
1996-97 
U.S. Internet Council National Association for Better Broadcasting 
Peacefire Americans of Italian Descent 
NetAction National Friends of Public Broadcasting 
Domain Name Rights Coalition Black Citizens for a Fair Media 
CypherNet Synanon Committee for a Responsible American Press 
Global Internet Liberty Campaign Media Action Research Center 
Internet Free Expression Alliance First Amendment Congress 
National Organization for Non-Enumeration Media Network 
Coalition Against Unsolicited Email (CAUCE) Women Against Pornography 
The Censorware Project American Israeli Civil Liberties Coalition 
 First Amendment Consumer and Trade Society 
 Feminists Fighting Pornography 
 Institute for Media Analysis 
 Reference Point Foundation 
 Center for the Study of Commercialism 
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Foundings Deaths 
1996-97, continued 
 American Satellite Television Alliance 
 People Against Telephone Terrorism and Harassment 
 National Public Radio Election Project 
 Privacy Global Resource Center 
1998-99 
Mediachannel.org Telecommunications and Telephone Association 
Commercial Alert American-Arab Relations Committee 
Citizens for Independent Public Broadcasting Americans for Decency 
People for Better TV Free Press Association 
Prometheus Radio Project Citizens for Media Responsibility Without Law 
 Radio Association Defending Airwave Rights 
 Strategies for Media Literacy 
 Always Causing Legal Unrest 
 National Campaign for Freedom of Expression 
 Digital Future Coalition 
2000-01 
Online Policy Group Polish-American Guardian Society 
Creative Commons Foundation to Improve Television 
Chilling Effects National Black Media Coalition 
Center for Digital Democracy DC Feminists Against Pornography 
SpamCon Foundation American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 
 Alternative to the New York Times Committee 
 Foundation for Moral Restoration 
 National Coalition Against Pornography 
 Coalition on Government Information 
 Parents Music Resource Center 
 Americans for Constitutional Freedom 
 Alliance Against Fraud in Telemarketing 
 Domain Name Rights Coalition 
 Internet Free Expression Alliance 
2002 
ACME Coalition Voters Telecommunication Watch  
Public Knowledge  
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7. Reinventing Media Activism 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, communication-information policy (CIP) replaced 
the environment as the policy domain of greatest congressional activity. From 1997 to 
2001, the annual number of Congressional hearings devoted to CIP topics surged to 
approximately 100 per year.  
 
Previously, CIP issues were segregated across different media and industries and 
different legal regimes, and were mostly handled in a national institutional framework. 
Policy ideas about them were not closely related. Now they have come together into a 
unified policy domain and have become global in scope. The convergence of the media 
on digital technology has made issues such as privacy, infrastructure regulation, 
censorship, open source, intellectual property, digital identity and government 
information policy related, interdependent, and central to social and economic life. The 
complex of communication-information policy issues can now stand on its own. CIP 
engages directly with core problems of a post-industrial society and need not be 
subordinate to other social movements; it can mobilize new constituencies and generate 
major institutional changes.  
 
The public interest advocacy group was an organizational innovation dating to the second 
half of the 1960s. Most of the growth in the organizational population took place in the 
1970s, as the organizational form was being developed and legitimated. The number of 
public interest advocacy organizations focused on CIP grew rapidly from 1966 to 1981, 
and then stabilized at around 100 organizations. It is now a routine part of the policy 
making environment, in CIP as well as other areas. While that form of advocacy is still 
vibrant and effective and its continued presence is required to maintain a public interest 
voice in DC policy making, it is unlikely to catalyze major institutional changes. A major 
revival of public interest activity around CIP is more likely to come from a) new ideas 
about institutional arrangements and b) structural changes in political institutions that 
open up new kinds of access to members of the public. The global mobilization of civil 
society groups around the World Summit on the Information Society provides only a 
whiff of the sort of public mobilization that can happen when institutions change to open 
up new kinds of access to policy making processes. We believe that while activists and 
advocates are using information and communication technologies in creative ways, 
political institutions have hardly begun to make adjustments to the potentialities of 
information and communication technologies. True online activism, in the sense of an 
interface between the public and the government that gives online communications the 
same status as face-to-face lobbying, is a matter for the future. Today, we see only use of 
online tools to enhance and support traditional forms of citizen-government interactions.  
 
Although the number of advocacy organizations has not changed much in the last twenty 
years, the rise of the Internet in the 1990s is associated with a major change in the 
composition of the advocacy organization population – a change, we believe, for the 
better. Many organizations focused on criticizing or regulating mass media content died 
off, although content-oriented advocacy remains a vital part of the total picture. The new 
organizations formed in the 1990s and 2000s tend to be focused on rights-oriented 
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advocacy related to digital technology, such as privacy rights, first amendment rights, and 
rights to fair use of intellectual property. There is also a growing recognition that how the 
communications infrastructure is regulated affects the preservation or protection of 
individual rights. Thus, rights-oriented advocacy begins to merge with economic modes 
of advocacy, further underscoring the need for an intellectually grounded, institutional 
approach to social change. 
 
Property rights to information are already emerging as the key area of contention, 
replacing mass media content as the focal point of activism. As production and 
distribution costs fall, channels proliferate, powerful information processing tools diffuse 
and the cultural stock of stored content grows exponentially, the problem of “what 
program do we see on TV” becomes less interesting, and old concepts of public trustee 
regulation less defensible. More interesting and important are the underlying property 
rights of the information economy: who owns the information and for how long, who 
owns the network that gets it to you, what rights do you have to use that network or to 
reuse or share the content, how much are vendors allowed to know about your selections, 
how much surveillance are users subjected to, and so on. Copyright, software patents, 
open source, trademark, exclusive or nonexclusive use of the radio spectrum – all deal 
more or less directly with property rights as they are understood by institutional 
economics. Even the privacy issue deals with who owns and has access to personal data. 
Who owns and has access to infrastructure and how those ownership rights are related to 
First Amendment norms and values is also a critical issue. 
 
In its measurement of testimony by public interest groups, the study found that during the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the American Civil Liberties Union dominated representation of 
public interest perspectives in Congressional testimony, accounting for 20% of all 
testimony by public interest groups of all ideologies on CIP topics. In the second half of 
the 1990s, however, the population of advocacy groups with a major voice in Washington 
diversified, and ACLU lost its dominance to organizations such as Center for Democracy 
and Technology (CDT), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and the 
Consumers Union. The top ten advocacy organizations account for about 50% of all 
testimony by public interest groups in the CIP policy domain. 
 
The population of public interest advocacy organizations focused on CIP is 
overwhelmingly liberal in ideological orientation. Conservative organizations as a 
percentage of the total population temporarily increased (from 15% to 21%) only in the 
1980s, when liberal organizations’ share declined from 54% to 48%. Since the 1980s, 
however, liberal organizations’ share of the population has increased steadily, reaching 
68% of all observations in the current decade. However, the meaning of “liberal” and 
“conservative” is shifting in the CIP domain, as ideological and cultural conservatives 
embrace “big government” in the form of pre-emptive wars, enormous budget deficits, 
pervasive surveillance, curtailment of civil liberties, and regulation of information 
technology to strengthen the interests of incumbent intellectual property holders.  
 
While left-liberal advocacy groups have had a tremendous impact on the social norms 
applied to the media, they have had only a marginal impact on economic institutions. 
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Whether it is the financial problems of public television, the marginal status of public 
access channels on cable, the absence of principled guidelines for media ownership 
restrictions, or the ambiguous legacy of broadcast license challenges, on economic issues 
left-liberal public interest groups have often been reactive or ineffective. There are 
various reasons for this. Some ultra-leftists are deeply wedded to fairy tales about pre-
capitalist utopias. Others are so fixated on the cultural aspects of communication that they 
fail to take any serious account of the contribution of the ICT sector to jobs, development 
and growth. Others simply react to problems and abuses in the market system without 
appreciating the pitfalls of government regulation or thinking through the problem of 
institutionalizing better, economically sustainable alternatives. Despite the rejection of 
the economic structure of media that is implicit in much left-liberal media activism, 
advocacy groups still lack a coherent, theoretically grounded alternative to the critique of 
regulation and the norms of efficiency, growth and technical innovation advanced by the 
advocates of market liberalization. Any critique of the status quo capable of leading to 
lasting institutional change must be grounded in economic theory and not detached from 
the realities of economic behavior; i.e., wealth needs to be preserved and accumulated not 
dissipated, and people who invest time, energy and capital to create value deserve to be 
rewarded in some way, otherwise they will curtail their effort and investment.  
 
A reinvented communication-information activism needs to develop an analytical 
framework that deeply comprehends the relationships between free expression, privacy, 
infrastructure regulation, intellectual property, digital identity and government 
information policy and relates social norms to them in ways that produce viable and 
effective policies. That rethinking has already begun, spearheaded by interdisciplinary 
legal thinkers such as Lessig, but much work remains to be done. 
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